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Introduction
Despite the ubiquitous reference to the concept of social norms in the
social sciences, there is no consensus about the power of social norms
to direct human action. For some, norms have a central and regular
influence on human behavior, while for others, the concept is too vague,
and the evidence we have about norm compliance is too contradictory to
support the claim that they appreciably affect behavior. Those who doubt
that norms have a behavior-guiding force argue that human behavior
only occasionally conforms with the dominant social. norms. If the same
norms are in place when behavior is norm-consisterit as when it is norm
inconsistent, why should we believe that norms mediated any of it?
Much of the discussion about the power norms have to affect behavior
arises from a confusion about what is meant by 'norm.' A norm can be
formal()r informal, personal or collective, descriptive ofwhat most people
do, or prescriptive of behavior. In the same social setting, conformity to
these different kinds of norms stems from a variety of motivations and
produces distinct, sometimes even opposing, behavioral patterns. Take
for example a culture in which many individuals have strong personal
norms that prohibit corrupt practices and in which there are legal norms
against bribing public officers, yet bribing is widespread and tolerated.
Suppose we were able to independently assess whether an individual has
' a personal norm against corruption. Can we predict whether a person,
who we'know condemns corruption, will bribe a public officer when given
a chance? Probably not, but we could come closer to a good prediction
if we knew certain factors and cues are present in this situation and have
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an influence on the decision. The theories of norms we have inherited,
mainly from sociology, offer little help, because they did not develop
an understanding of the conditions under which individuals are likely to
follow a norm or, when several norms may apply, what makes one of them
focal.
A first step in the direction of a deeper understanding of what motivates us to follow a norm is to clarify what we mean by a social norm.
'Norm' is a term used to refer to a variety of behaviors, and accompanying expectations. These should not be lumped together, on pain of
missing some important features that are of great help in understanding
phenomena such as variance in norm compliance. Inconsistent conformity, for example, is to be expected with certain types of norms, but not
with others. In this chapter I put forth a 'constructivist' theory of norms,
one that explains norms in terms of the expectations and preferences
of those who follow them. My view is that the very existence of a social
norm depends on a sufficient number of people believing that it exists
and pertains to a given type of situation, and expecting that enough other
people are following it in those kinds of situations. Given the right kind
of expectations, people will have conditional preferences for obeying a
norm, meaning that preferences will be conditional on having expectations about other people's conformity. Such expectations and preferences will result in collective behaviors that further confirm the existence
of the norm in the eyes of its followers.
Expectations and conditional preferences are the building blocks of
several social constructs, though, not just social norms. Descriptive norms
such as fashions and fads are also based on expectations of conformity
and conditional preferences, and so are conventions, such as signaling systems, rules of etiquette, and traffic rules. In both cases, the preference
for conformity does not clash with self-interest, especially if we define it
in purely material terms.l One can model descriptive norms and conventions as solutions to coordination games. Such games capture the
structure of situations where there exist several possible equilibria and,
although we might like one of them best, what we most want is to coordinate with others on any equilibrium; hence we act in conformity to
' what we expect others to do. Descriptive norms and conventions are thus
representable as equilibria of original coordination games. Social norms,·
on the contrary, often go against narrow self-interest, as when we are
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required to cooperate, reciprocate, act fairly, or do anything that may
involve some material cost or the forgoing of some benefit. The kinds of
problems that social norms are meant to solve differ from the coordination problems that conventions and descriptive norms 'solve.' We need
ocialnorms in all those situations in which there is conflict of interest
s
- -·
but also a potential for joint gain. The games that social norms solve are
called mixed-motive games. 2 Such mixed-motive games are not games
of coordination to start with, but social norms, as I shall argue, transform
mixed-motive games into coordination ones. This transformation, however, hinges on each individual expecting enough other people to follow
the norm, too. If this expectation is violated, an individual will revert to
playing the original game and to behaving 'selfishly.' This chapter thus
starts with a precise definition of social norms and only later considers
what differentiates such norms from descriptive norms and conventions.
Because all three are based on expectations and conditional preferences,
I pay special attention to the nature of expectations (empirical and/or
normative) that support each construct.
The definition of social norm I am proposing should be taken as a
rational reconstruction of what a social norm is, not a faithful descriptive
account of the real beliefs and preferences people have or of the way in
which they in fact deliberate. Such a reconstruction, however, will have
to be reliable in that it must be possible to extract meaningful, testable
predictions from it. This is one of the tasks I undertake in ChaRters 3
and 4. An important claim I make in this chapter is that the belief/ desire
model of choice that is the core of my rational reconstruction of social
norms does not commit us to avow that we always engage in conscious
deliberation to decide whether to follow a norm. We may follow a norm
automatically and thoughtlessly and yet still be able to explain our action
in terms of beliefs and desires.
The simplistic, common view that we conform to norms either because
of external sanctions or because they have been internalized flies in the
face of much evidence that people sometimes obey norms even in the
absence of any obvious incentive structure or personal commitment to
what the norm stands for (Cialdini et al. 1990). Many who postulate internal or external incentives as the sole reasons for compliance also maintain compliance is the result of a conscious process of balancing costs
2
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What one most prefers in these cases is to 'do as others do,' or to coordinate with others'
choices.
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Well-known examples of mixed-motive games that can be 'solved' (or better, 'transformed') by norms of fairness, reciprocity, promise-keeping, etc., are the Prisoner's
Dilemma, the Trust game, and Ultimatum games.
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and benefits, culminating in a decision to conform or to transgress.
Yet personal experience tells us that compliance is often automatic and
unreflective: Even important social norms like those that regulate fair
exchanges and reciprocation are often acted on without much thought
to (or awareness of) their personal or social consequences. Whereas the
literature on social norms has traditionally stressed the deliberational side
of conformity, in this book I want to emphasize its automatic component.
Both aspects are important, but too much emphasis on conscious deliberation may miss crucial links between decision heuristics and norms, as
I explain in this chapter and the next.
Whenever we enter any environment, we have to decide how to behave.
There are two ways to reach a decision. One is somewhat ideally depicted
by the traditional rational choice model: We may systematically assess the
situation, gather information, list and evaluate the possible consequences
of different actions, assess the probability of each consequence occurring,
and then calculate the expected utility of the alternative courses of action
and choose one that maximizes our expected utility. I dub this the deliberational route to behavior. The process of rational deliberation ending in
the choice of a course of action is likely to be costly in time, resources, and
effort and to require considerable skill. The deliberational way to behavior is likely to be chosen when one is held accountable for one's choice;
when the consequences may be particularly important and long-lasting;
or when one has the time, knowledge, and disposition to ponder over
alternative choices. But even in these cases deliberation may fall short
of the ideal. Behavioral decision theorists have gathered compelling evidence that actors systematically violate the assumptions of rational choice
theory (Camerer 2003). Thus the deliberational way need not assume
perfect rationality. It only requires conscious deliberation and balancing of what one perceives (or misperceives) as the costs and benefits of
alternative courses of action. On occasion we do engage in conscious
deliberation, even if the process is marred by mistakes of judgment and
calculation.

lie beyond awareness and probablyoccur in split seconds. Models of mental processes (Lamberts and Shanks 1997) suggest that, when faced with
a new situation, we immediately search for cues about how to interpret it
or what is appropriate behavior for that situation. It is conjectured that
we compare the siJ~ation. we face with others we remember that possess
similar characteristics, and that this comparison activates behavior that
is considered most "normal" for this type of situation. The comparison
process is one of 'categorization,' of finding relevant similarities between
the current context and other ones we have experienced in the past. To
efficiently search our memory and group a new event with previously
encountered ones, we use cognitive shortcuts. Cognitive shortcuts play
a crucial role in categorization and the subsequent activation of scripts
and schemata. 3 Consequently, they are responsible for some norms rather
than others being activated in different situations. Let us call this route
to behavior the heuristic route. In the heuristic route, behavior is guided
by default rules stored in memory that are cued by contextual stimuli.
Norms are one class of default rules. According to the heuristic route,
norm compliance .is an automatic response to situational cues that focus
our attention on a particular norm, rather than a conscious decision to
give priority to normative considerations. On the heuristic view, norms are
context-dependent, meaning that different social norms will be activ<;J.ted,
or appear appropriate, depending on how a situation is understood. In
turn, our understanding of a situation is influenced by which previous
contexts we view as similar to the present one, and this process of assess~
ing similarities and 'fitting' a situation into ·a pre-existing category will
make specific norms salient. I spell out in detail the process of drawing
social inferences and categorizing in the next chapter.
The distinction between deliberational and heuristic routes to behavior is a useful simplification, and it should be taken as such. The truth is
that we often combine the two routes, and what is a staple of the heuristic process can also be an object of deliberation. Conformity to a norm,
for example, is not always an automatic, nondeliberational affair. Especially when we are tempted to shirk an obligation, the thought of the
personal and social consequences of alternative courses of action is often
present and important in determining our choice. I want to stress, again,
that deliberation is not synonymous with 'rational deliberation', in part

A second way to reach a decision relies on following behavioral rules
that prescribe a particular course of action for the situation (or a class of
similar situations). These guides to behavior include habits, roles, and, of
course, norms. Once one adopts a behavioral rule, one follows it without .
the conscious and systematic assessment of the situation performed in
deliberation. The question of how a particular behavioral rule is primed
is of great interest. The answer is likely to lie in the interplay of (external)
situational cues and (internal) categorization processes. These processes
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Schemata are cognitive structures that contain knowledge about people, events, roles,
etc. Schemata for events (e.g., a lecture, going to a restaurant, playing a chess game) are
also call~d scripts. Chapter 2 further elaborates on the roles of scripts and schemata.
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because the list of possible mistakes and cognitive impairments with which
our decision processes are fraught is potentially very long. Rational deliberation is better conceived of as an ideal type, against which we measure the
amplitude of our deviations. What is important in deliberation is the conscious processing of information and evaluation of options. Whether ideally or less than ideally rational, deliberation refers to beliefs and desires
of which we are aware: Deliberation is the process of consciously choosing
what we most desire according to our beliefs. In the deliberational view,
beliefs and desires (preferences) are treated as mental states of which we
are conscious, at least in the course of deciding which action to take.
The problem with taking beliefs and desires to be conscious mental
states is that they can then play no role in the heuristic route to behavior.
There is, however, a long and reputable philosophical tradition that takes
beliefs and desires to be dispositions to act in a certain way in the appropriate circumstance. According to the dispositional account, to say that
someone has a belief or a preference implies that we expect such motives
to manifest themselves in the relevant circumstances. Thus, for example,
one might automatically obey a norm of truth-telling without thinking
of the beliefs and preferences that underlie one's behavior. These beliefs
and preferences might become manifest only when they happen to be
unfulfilled. To assess the nature of such beliefs and desires, all we need
is a simple counterfactual exercise. Suppose we ask someone if he would
keep telling the truth (as he normally and almost automatically does)
in a world where he came to realize that people systematically lie. Our
subject may answer in a variety of ways, but whatever course of action he
claims he would choose, it is likely that he never thought of it before.
He did not know, for example, that he would be ready to become a liar
until he was put in the condition to reflect on it. Our subject may reason that it would be stupid on his part to keep telling the truth, as it
would put him at an obvious disadvantage. Evidently his preference for
sincerity is conditional on expecting reciprocity. If these expectations
were not met, his preference would be different. Note that dispositions
need not be stable: Preferences, for example, can be context-dependent,
in the sense that even a small change of context may elicit different,
even opposite, preferences. The research on framing effects shows just
that (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). The heuristic way to behavior seems·
perfectly compatible with a dispositional account of beliefs and desires.
Namely, the default rules that we tend to automatically follow are accompanied and supported by beliefs and desires that we become aware of
only when they are challenged. Surprise in this case breeds awareness of

our underlying motives. Moreover, whenever a norm is 'cued' or made
salient in a particular environment, the mechanism that primes it elicits the beliefs and preferences that support that particular norm. The
remainder of this chapter presents a taxonomy of norms that relies on
prefe-rences and b_(!_lj_ef.s '!§.:building blocks.'
The idea that social norms may be cued, and hence manipulated, is
attractive. It suggests that we may be able to induce pro-social behavior
and maintain social order at low cost. Norms differ in different cultures,
and what cues a Westerner into cooperation will probably differ from what
cues a Mapuche Indian (Henrich 2000). In both cases, however, it may
be possible to structure the environment in a way that produces desirable
behavior. If you sail along the Italian coast, you will notice large beach
posters that invite sailors not to litter and pollute "your" sea. In Sweden,
instead, environmentalist appeals always refer to "our" environment. The
individualistic Italians are seemingly thought to be more responsive to
an invitation to protect a "private" good, whereas Swedes are expected
to be sensitive to pleas for the common good. Knowing what makes people focus on the environment in a positive way can be a powerful tool
in the hands of shrewd policymakers. Still, developing successful policies that rely on social norms presents several difficulties. To successfully
manipulate social settings, we need to predict how people will interpret
a given context, which cues will 'stand out' as salient, and how particular cues relate to certain norms. When multiple conflicting norms could
apply, we should be able to tell which cues will favor one of them. Many
norms are not socially beneficial, and once established they are difficult
to eliminate. If we know what induces people to conform to "anti-social"
norms, we may have a chance to curb destructive behavior. Without a better understanding of the mechanisms through which norms control our
actions, however, there is little hope of predicting and thus influencing
behavior. The mechanisms that induce conformity are very different for
different kinds of norms. Consequently, a good understanding of their
diversity will prevent us from focusing on the wrorig type of norm in our
efforts to induce pro-social behavior.
In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce the reader to my
definition of social norms, descriptive norms, conventions, and the conditions under which one might see individuals following any of these. I
shall especially focus on the four (individually) necessary and (jointly)
sufficient conditions for a social norm to exist that I develop in the following pages: contingency, empirical expectations, normative expectations,
and conditignal preferences.
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Social Norms

•.

Social norms are frequently confused with codified rules, normative
expectations, or recurrent, observable behavior. However, there are significant problems with such definitions of social norms. By the term social
norm, I shall always refer to informal norms, as opposed to formal, codified norms such as legal rules. Social norms are, like legal ones, public and
shared, but, unlike legal rules, which are supported by formal sanctions,
social norms may not be enforced at all. When they are enforced, the sanctions are informal, as when the violation of a group norm brings about
responses that range from gossip to open censure, ostracism, or dishonor
for the transgressor. Some such norms may become part of our system
ofvalues, and we may feel a strong obligation to obey them. Guilt and
remorse will accompany transgression, as much as the breach of a moral
rule elicits painfully negative feelings in the offender. Social norms should
also be distinguished from moral rules: As I shall argue in the following,
expectations are crucial in sustaining the former but not necessarily the
latter. In particular, conformity to a social norm is conditional on expectations about other people's behavior and/ or beliefs. The feelings of
shame and guilt that may accompany a transgression merely reinforce
one's tendency to conform, but they are never the sole or the ultimate
determinants of conformity. I will come back to this point later.
A norm cannot be simply identified with a recurrent, collective behavioral pattern. For one, norms can be either prescriptive or proscriptive:
In the latter case, we usually do not observe the proscribed behavior. As
anyone who has lived in a foreign country knows, learning proscriptive
norms can be difficult and the learning process slow and fraught with misunderstandings and false steps. Often the legal system helps, in that many
proscriptive norms are made explicit and supported by laws, but a host of
socially relevant proscriptions such as "do not stare at someone you pass
by" or "do not touch people you are not intimate with when you talk to
them" are not codified and can only be learned by trial and error. In most
cases in which a proscriptive norm is in place, we do not observe the behavior proscribed by the norm, and it is impossible to determine whether
the absence of certain behaviors is due to a proscription or to something
else, unless we assess people's beliefs and expectations. Furthermore, if·
we were to adopt a purely behavioral account of norms, nothing would
distinguish shared fairness criteria from, say, the collective morning habit
of brushing one's teeth. It would also be difficult to deal with those cases
in which people pay lip service to the norm in public and deviate in
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private. Avoiding a purely behavioral account means focusing on the
role expectations play in supporting those kinds of collective behaviors
that we take to be norm-driven. After all, I brush my teeth whether or not
1 expect others to do the same, but I would not even try to ask for a salary
proportionate to my_educ,:ation if I expected my co-workers to go by the
rule of giving to each in proportion to seniority. There are also behaviors
that can be explained only by the existence of norms, even if the behavior prescribed by the norm in question is never observed. In his study
of the lk, Turnbull (1972) reports that these starved hunter-gatherers
tried hard to elude situations where their compliance with norms of reciprocity was expected. Thus they would go out of their way to avoid being
in the role of gift-taker. A leaking roof would be repaired at night, so as to
ward off offers to help and future obligations to repay the favor. Hunting
was a solitary and furtive activity, so as to escape the obligation to share
one's bounty with anyone encountered along the way. Much of the lk's
behavior can be explained as a successful attempt at eluding existing reciprocity norms. The Ik seemed to have collective beliefs about what sort
of behavior was prescribed/proscribed in a given social context but acted
in ways that prevented the underlying norms from being activated. Their
practices demonstrate that it is not necessary to observe compliance to
argue that a norm exists and affects behavior.
As Turnbull's example shows, having normative beliefs and expecting
others to conform to a norm do not always result in a norm being activated. Nobody is violating the norm, but everybody is trying to avoid situations where they would have to follow it. Thus, simply focusing on norms
as clusters of expectations might be as misleading as focusing only on the
behavioral dimension, because there are many examples of discrepancies
between normative expectations and behavior. Take the widely acknowledged norm of self-interest (Miller and Ratner 1998): It is remarkable to
observe how often people (especially in the United States) expect others
to ac:;t selfishly, even when they are prepared to act altruistically themselves. Studies show that people's willingness to give blood is not altered
by monetary incentives, but typically those very people who are willing to
donate blood for free expect others to donate blood only in the presence
of a sufficient monetary reward (Wuthnow 1991). Similarly, when asked
whether they would rent an apartment to an unmarried couple, all landlords interviewed in Oregon in the early 1970s answered positively, but
they estimated that only 50% of other landlords would accept an unmarried couple as tenants (Dawes 1972). Such cases are rather common;
what is puzzling is that peQple may expect a given norm to be upheld
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in the absence of information about other people's conforming behavior and in the face of personal evidence to the contrary. Thus, simply
focusing on people's expectations may tell us very little about collective
behavior.
If a purely behavioral definition of norms is deficient, and one solely
based on expectations is questionable, what are we left with? Norms refer
to behavior, to actions over which people have control, and are supported
by shared expectations about what should/should not be done in different types of social situations. Norms, however, cannot just be identified
with observable behavior, nor can they be equated with normative beliefs,
as normative beliefs may or may not result in appropriate actions. In
what follows I introduce a definition of social norms that will be helpful in shedding light on the conceptual differences between different
types of social rules. My definition coincides with ordinary usage in some
respects but departs from that usage in others. Given the fact that the
term has been put to multiple uses, it would be unrealistic to expect a
single definition to agree with what each person using the term means.
The goal of giving a specific definition is to single out what is fundamental to social norms, what differentiates them from other types of social
constructs.
Besides helping in drawing a taxonomy of social rules, a successful
definition should provide conditions under which normative beliefs can
be expected to be consistent with behavior. This means that those conditions that are part of the definition of social norm would be used as
premises in a practical argument whose conclusion is the decision to
conform to a norm. This does not entail that we normally engage in
such practical reasoning and deliberation and are consciously aware of
our conforming choices. We should not confuse adopting a belief/ desire
explanatory framework with assuming awareness of our own mental processes. As I shall discuss in the last section, the fact that we are mostly
unaware of our mental processes, and often are not fully conscious of what
we are thinking and doing, is no objection to a belief/desire model of
choice.
The definition I am proposing should be taken as a rational reconstruction of what a social norm is, not a description of the real preferences and
beliefs people have or the way in which they in fact deliberate (if at all).
The advantage of a rational reconstruction is that it substitutes a precise
concept for an imprecise one, thus removing the conceptual difficulties
and vagueness related to everyday usage. A rational reconstruction of
the concept of norm specifies in which sense one may say that norms

are rational, or compliance with a norm is rationa1. 4 Not every rational
reconstruction will do, though. For example, a rational reconstruction
that is built on a belief/ desire structure is constrained by the requirement
that, were beliefs to be different (in a specified sense), we would expect
beh;:tvior to· change in predictable ways. In other words, a successful
rational reconstruction must allow meaningful, interesting predictions
to be made.
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Conditions for a Social Norm to Exist
Let R be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where Scan be represented as a mixed-motive game. We say that R is a social norm in a population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset Per <; P such that, for
each individual i E Per:
Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of
typeS;
Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S
on the condition that:
(a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P
conforms to R in situations of type S;
and either
(b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P
expects i to conform to R in situations of type S;
or
(b') Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a sufficiently
large subset of Pexpects ito conform toR in situations of type S,
prefers i to conform, and may sanction behavior.
A social norm R is followed by population P if there exists a sufficiently
large subset P1 ~Per such that, for each individual i E Pp conditions 2(a)
and either 2 (b) or 2 (b') are met for i and, as a result, i prefers to conform
to R in situations of type S.
There are several features of the above definition that need explanation. First, note that a rule Rcan be a social norm for a population Peven
if it is not currently being followed by P. I defined Per as the set of 'conditional followers' of R, those individuals who know about Rand have a
conditional preference for conforming toR. I defined Pr as the set of 'followers' of R, those individuals who know about Rand have a preference
4

E. Ullmann-Margalit (1977) made one of the first attempts at explaining norms and norm
compliance in a rational choice framework.
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for conforming to R (because they believe that the conditions for their
conditional preference are fulfilled). A behavioral rule R is a social norm
if the set of its conditional followers is sufficiently large; a social norm is
followed if the set of its followers is sufficiently large. Second, note that a
social norm is defined relative to a population: A behavioral rule R can
be a social norm for one population P and not for another population
P'. Finally, the 'sufficiently large subset Per of P'' clause reflects the fact
that social norms need not be universally conditionally preferred or even
universally known about in order to exist. A certain amount of opportunistic transgression is to be expected whenever a norm conflicts with
individuals' self-interest. The 'sufficiently large subset Pr of Per' clause
reflects the fact that, even among conditional followers of a norm, some
individuals may not follow the norm because their empirical and normative expectations have not been fulfilled. Moreover, even among the
members of Pr, occasional deviance due to mistakes is to be expected.
How much deviance is tolerable is an empirical matter and may vary with
different norms. For example, we would expect Per (the proportion of
conditional followers) to be equal to Pin the case of group norms, especially when the group is fairly small, whereas Pct will be close toP in the
case of well-entrenched social norms. For new norms, or norms that are
not deemed to be socially important, the subset Pcf could be significantly
smaller than P. I will discuss deviance and its effects in later chapters,
when I address the issue of norm dynamics. It should also be noted that
I do ·not assume Pr (the proportion of actual followers) to be common
knowledge. Different individuals will have different beliefs about the size
of Pr and thus have different empirical expectations. If so, they will have
different thresholds for what 'sufficiently large' means. What matters to
actual conformity is that each individual in Pct believes that her threshold
has been reached or surpassed.
Condition 1, the contingency condition, says that actors are aware that a
certain behavioral rule exists and applies to situations of type S. This collective awareness is constitutive of its very existence as a norm. Note that
norms are understood to apply to classes or families of situations, not
to every possible situation or context. A norm of revenge, for example,
usually applies to members of a kinship group and is suspended in case
of proven accidental death. A norm of reciprocity may not be expected
to apply if the gift was a bribe, and the rules that govern fair allocation of
bodily organs differ from those that regulate the fair allocation ofuniver- .
sity Ph.D. slots. Situational contingency explains why people sometimes
try to manipulate norms by avoiding those situations to which the norm
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applies (as the Ik did with food sharing and gift reciprocation) or by
negotiating the meaning of a particular situation.
Condition 2(a), the empirical expectations condition, says that expectations of conformity matter. I take them to be empirical expectations, in the
sense that one expec~_people to follow R in situations of type S because
one has observed them to do just that over a long period of time. If the
present situation is of type S, one can reasonably infer that, ceteris paribus,
people will conform to R as they always did in the past. Notice that the
fulfillment of Condition 2(a) entails that a social norm is practiced (or is
believed to be practiced) in a given population (which may be as small as
a group comprising a few members or as large as a nation); otherwise
there would not be empirical expectations. Sometimes expectations are
formed not by directly observing conforming behavior, but rather its consequences. This would happen, for example, with norms regulating private behavior. In this case, public support might be voiced for a norm that
is seldom adhered to in private. conformity to such a norm is believed
to produce observable consequences, then observing such consequences
will validate the norm."$ut if these consequences are the effect of other
causes, people will draJ the wrong inference and continue to believe that
the norm is widely followed even when support is dwindling. Consider a
norm of private behavior such as avoiding premarital sex; what we observe
are the consequences of such behavior (teen pregnancy, etc.) or the lack
thereof. If people take adequate precautions, there might be greater
deviance than expected, but people might still believe that the norm is
widely practiced in the population. 5 Norms regulating private behavior
may thus present us with cases in which Conditions 2(a) and 2(b) are
satisfied. However, as I shall make clear in discussing Conditions 2(b)
and 2(b'), there are many individuals for whom 2(b'), the possibility of
sanctions, is a necessary condition for compliance. Such individuals will
believe they are expected to follow the norm but will not expect to be
sanctioned for transgressing it [Condition 2 (b')], because deviance can
be concealed. In this case, public endorsement of the norm may coexist
with considerable private deviance.
The expectations mentioned in Condition 2(a) could, besides being
empirical, also be normative, in the sense that people might think that
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I would venture the hypothesis that norms regulating private behavior may survive longer
than other norms precisely because of the lack of direct observation of compliance. On
the other hand, they may decay very quickly once the magnitude of deviance becomes
public knowledge, as I discuss in Chapter 5.
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everyone 'ought to' conform to Rin situations of typeS. The 'ought' implicit in a normative belief does not necessarily state an obligation. Take,
for instance, a well-known convention such as the rule of driving on the
right side of the road. We believe that people ought to follow that rule
simply because, if they do not, they risk killing or being killed. If a person
does not want to jeopardize her life, nor does she have an interest in
causing harm to others, then we believe she 'ought to' follow the driving
rule. The 'ought' in this case expresses prudential reasons and is akin to
saying that, if you have goal x and the best available means to attain xis
a course of action y, then you ought to adopt y. Consider, on the other
hand, a rule of equal division. In this case, we may believe that others
ought to 'divide the cake in equal parts' because this is the fair thing
to do. We think they have an obligation to follow the rule, a duty to be
fair. I do not ask for the moment what grounds this obligation, though I
shall come back to this question later. At this point it is only important
to make a distinction between a prudential 'ought' and the statement of
an obligation. From now on, when I mention 'normative expectations'
I will always refer to the latter meaning.
Normative expectations do not necessarily trump empirical ones, and
very often they coexist. Many well-entrenched social norms are thought
to be good or reasonable, and people often refer to these qualities in
justifying their own compliance, as well as in expecting other people to
comply. Yet there are also cases in which most people do not think that
others ought to conform to a norm, even when they observe widespread
conformity (i.e., the number of those prepared to sanction others is very
small). This happens with norms that many, maybe most, people dislike
and yet are followed by everyone. Wearing a veil may be an unpleasant
requirement for many Muslim women, and they may not believe_ that
one 'ought to' wear it (apart from prudential reasons). But if each woman
holds the belief that she is expected to wear a veil, in the sense of believing
that a sufficiently large number of people think she ought to wear a veil
and prefer that she wears a veil (because it is her religious duty to do so),
then she will feel great social pressure in that direction, and the result will
be overall collective compliance. In this case the norm regulates public,
observable behavior; hence a transgression is easily detected and likely
to be punished. If it is not public knowledge that most women dislike
the veil, a woman may even take widespread adherence to this norm as
evidence that other women follow this practice out of a deep religious
conviction, and infer that she is expected by everyon<:! else to fulfill her
religious duty as well. Everyone may secretly feel she is a deviant, but they

will never openly question the norm. I will discuss in Chapter 5 how such
'pluralistic ignorance' may be responsible for the survival of norms that
most people dislike. 6 For now it is enough to emphasize that a normative
interpretation of Condition 2 (a) is not necessary for my argument.
Conditions 2 (b)_!lnd ~(1;>') tell us that people may have different reasons for conditionally preferring to follow a norm. Condition 2(b), the
normative expectations condition, says that expectations are believed to be reciprocal. That is, not only do I expect others to conform, but I also believe
they expect me to conform. What sort of belief is this? On the one hand,
it might just be an empirical belief. Ifl have consistently followed Rin situations of type Sin the past, people may reasonably infer that, ceteris paribus, I will do the same in the future, and that is what I believe. On the
other hand, it might be a normative belief: I believe a sufficiently large
number of people think that I have an obligation to conform to R in the
appropriate circumstances. For some individuals, the fulfillment of Conditions 2(a) and 2(b) is sufficient to induce a preference for conformity.
That is, such individuals recognize the legitimacy of others' expectations
and feel an obligation to fulfill them. For others, the possibility of sanctions is crucial to induce a preference for conformity. Condition 2(b')
says that I believe that those who expect me to conform also prefer me to
conform, and might be prepared to sanction my behavior when they can
observe it. Sanctions may be positive or negative. The possibility of sanctions may motivate some individuals to follow a norm, either out of fear
of punishment or because of a desire to please and thus be rewarded. Forothers, sanctions are irrelevant, and a normative expectation is all they
need. Condition 2 (b') does not say that transgressions will be punished
and compliance rewarded. It only states that a sufficiently large subset
of P may be capable and willing to sanction others. As we shall see in
a moment, normative expectations are essential for the enforcement of
social norms.
Now suppose Conditions 1, 2(a), and either 2(b) or 2(b') hold. Each
of them is a necessary condition for conformity to R, but contingency,
empirical, and normative expectations are not jointly sufficient to produce
conformity to rule Rin situations of type S. I might expect others to follow
a rule of equal division, and believe that I am expected to follow that rule
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What social psychologists call pluralistic ignorance is a psychological state characterized by
the belief that one's private thoughts, attitudes, and feelings are different from those of
others, when in fact they are not, in a situation where public behavior contradicting these
private thoughts and attitudes is identical (Allport 1924; Miller and McFarland 1991).

too, but when it is my turn to 'cut the cake,' I may be tempted to get a
larger share, especially if nobody is observing my action. If I do not, ·
must be that I prefer to conform to the rule. However, this is no simple,
unconditional preference for conformity. Condition 2, the conditional
preference condition, says this preference is conditional on expecting others
to conform to Rand either believing that one is expected to conform toR
or believing that those who expect one to conform also have a preference
for collective conformity and are prepared to punish or reward. If so, the
counter factual "If I were to believe that otpers do not follow R or do not
expect me to follow R, then I would not want to conform to R" must
be true. vVhat I am saying suggests that following a social norm may
be contrary to self-interest, especially if we define it in purely material
terms. Thus it may be the case that, in the presence of monetary or
otherwise 'material' rewards, I have a tendency to prefer more to less but
will prefer to 'share' if I believe that I am in a situation in which some
form of generosity is the norm, if I expect others to be generous, and if
I believe them to think I 'ought to' be generous in the circumstances. In
this case, I might prefer to behave generously. Note that the generous
behavior induced by adherence to a norm should not be confused with
other motives, such as altruism or benevolence.
Before we continue our discussion of Condition 2, let us look at an
example that will hopefully clarity what I mean by saying that the motive
to follow a norm should be distinguished from other motives. Consider
playing a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, where C stands for Cooperate and
D stands for Defect.
If the payoffs in Figure 1.1 represent sums of money, just by looking
at them it is not obvious what a player will choose. Suppose Self, the row
player, only cares about his 'material' self-interest and thus prefers DC
to CC, CC toDD, and DD to CD. IfB stands for best, S for second best,
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T for third best, and W for worst, the preference ranking of a narrowly
self-interested Self would look like that shmvn in Figure 1.2.
.
The narrowly self-interested person will always choose D, her dommant
strategy. Self-interest, however, should not be confused with :he desire.for
material incentives. A self-interested person is one whose ultimate desires
are self-regarding, but these desires can involve 'immaterial' goods ~uch
as power and recognition, or the experience o~ 'benevolent'. emotions.
A self-interested person may want to 'feel good (or reap. social n:war~s
like status and love) by reciprocating expected cooperation and m this
7
case her preferences would look like those in Figure 1.3.
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One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma from the perspective ofbenevolentSelf

I am assuming for simplicity that the benevolent individual is concerne~ with the materi~l
well-being of another. The same assumption holds for the pure altruist. However, their.
utility functions look very different. If Xi and xi are the payoffs, respectively, of player x
and player j, the pure altruist's utility will be U; J(x1), ar:d 8Uiflixi_> 0. The ~enevolent
player's utility instead will be U; /( x;, Xj), and the first partml denvatJves of U; With respect
to x;, x1, will be strictly positive.
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FIGURE 1.5.

One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma from the perspective of norm-following

Self

Note that a benevolent person would prefer CD to DC; that is, she
would prefer, ceteris paribus, to be the righteous sucker rather than the
spiteful cheat. This preference would probably be cost-sensitive, but if
the costs are not too high, it makes sense to prefer to 'feel good about
oneself and be the loser rather than penalizing another to get some small
benefit.
Benevolent motives are different from those of a pure altruist, whom
I take to be a person whose ultimate desires are completely otherregarding. A pure altruist wants, first and foremost, the satisfaction of
another's desires, at whatever cost to the self. 8 If the altruist believes
his partner to be a narrowly self-interested type, the altruist's preference
ranking would look like the one in Figure 1.4.
The person who instead follows a norm of generosity or cooperation
need not have a desire to 'feel good': If the established norm is a cooperative one, provided Conditions 2(a) and either 2(b) or 2(b') are met,
the preference ranking of the norm follower will look like the one in
Figure 1.5.
The norm follower's preferences are similar to those of the selfinterested, benevolent person, with a crucial difference: For the benevolent person, it is better to be the 'sucker' than the 'crook' (CD is preferred to DC); but for the norm follower, the reverse may be true. 9 This
distinction should not be interpreted as denying that individuals can be
both benevolent and norm followers. Benevolence, however, is usually
8
9

The choice to donate part of one's liver to an anonymous recipient is an example of
altruism, because the risk of complications and even death from the procedure is sizable.
Again, I am assuming for simplicity that the norm follower is not also benevolent. If this
were the case, Figures 1.3 and 1.5 would coincide, at least in all those situations to which
benevolence applies. In large, anonymous groups, where the effects of one's actions are
insignificant, we may expect less cooperation (or not at all) from the benevolent person,
whereas the norm follower would not be affected.

directed to people with whom we habitually interact and know well. As
social distance increases, benevolence tends to decrease. If most people
were benevolent toward strangers, we would need no pro-social norms
of fairness, reciprocity, or cooperation. In particular, we would have no
need for those norms that 'internalize' externalities created by behavior
that imposes costs on other people. Thus it is plausible that one is guided
by benevolence (or even altruism) in interacting with family and friends,
but when interacting with strangers, be guided by social norms. Moreover, whereas benevolence toward those who are close to us should be a
relatively stable disposition, generosity or cooperativeness with strangers
will vary according to our expectations, as defined in Conditions 2(a)
and 2(b) or 2(b').
It may be objected that motivational distinctions are futile, because
often observation cannot discriminate among them. If in a one-shot social
dilemma experiment we observe consistent cooperative behavior, what
can we say about the underlying preferences? If, as economists do, we take
preferences to describe behavior and not motivation, what we observe is
a 'revealed preference' for taking into account other people's welfare.
Why we do that does not matter. Still, I believe motivations carry some
weight. Up to now, most experiments have been geared to show that
human behavior consistently deviates from the narrow, self-interested
paradigm postulated by traditional economic models. Experiments have
been very successful in this respect, yet they do not tell us why actors
have other-regarding preferences. Is it altruism, benevolence, or are we
priming norms of fairness and reciprocity? The answer is clearly important, and not just for the policymaker. What we now need is to test more
sophisticated hypotheses about what goes on in the black box. To do so
it is important to pay attention to the meanings of the concepts we use

20

The Rules We Live By

(and test). To tell altruism and benevolence apart is not very difficult: If ·
an altruist is informed that the other defected, the altruist should keep
cooperating. Never mind there are very few such people around: If they .
exist, that is the way altruists will behave. The benevolent individual and
the norm follower are more difficult to set apart. For one, a norm follower
may also be motivated by benevolence. If, however, some norm followers are not benevolent, the distinction would be most clear in all those
situations in which people are forced to choose between CD and DC.
Suppose we identify a subset of people who 'conditionally cooperate' in
one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas. That is, controlling for their expectations,
they cooperate whenever they expect others to cooperate, too. It should
be possible to perform another experiment on the same individuals in
which the only choice is one between being the sucker or the crook: The
subject might be told that the other player will choose next, and will have
to choose the opposite of what she does. Provided the personal cost is
not too high, the benevolent person should prefer being the sucker. A
person who instead followed a cooperative norm for reasons other than
benevolence would see no reason to be the sucker (possibly provided the
cost to the other person is not too great).
Condition 2 (the conditional preference condition) marks an important
distinction between social and personal norms, whether they are habits
or have moral force. Take the habit of brushing my teeth every morning.
I find it sanitary, and I like the taste of mint toothpaste. Even ifl came to
realize that most people stopped brushing their teeth, I would continue to
do so, because I have independent reasons for doing it. It is likewise with
moral norms: I have good, independent reasons to avoid killing people I
deeply dislike. Even iflwere to find myself in a Hobbesian state of nature,
without rules or rights, I would still feel repugnance and anguish at the
idea of taking a life. With this I do not mean to suggest that moral norms
are a world apart from other rules. Instead, by their very nature, moral
norms demand (at least in principle) an unconditional commitment. 10

10

It might be argued that even what we usually underst~nd as moral norms are conditional.
One may be thoroughly committed to respect the sanctity of human life, but there are
circumstances in which one's commitment would waver. Imagine finding oneself in a
community where violence and murder are daily occurrences, expected and condoned
by most. One would probably at first resist violence, then react to it, and finally act it
out oneself. Guilt and remorse would in time be replaced by complacency, as one might
come to feel the act of murder to be entirely necessary and justified. The testimonies of
survivors of concentration camps, as well a.S the personal recollections of SS officers, are
frightening examples of how fragile our most valued principles can be.
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Commitments of course may falter, and we may run afoul of even the
most cherished obligations. The point is that, under normal conditions,
expectations of other people's conformity to a moral rule are not a good
reason to obey it. Nor is it a good reason that others expect me to follow
a moral rule. If Lfind their expectation reasonable, it is because I find
the moral norm reasonable; so the reason to obey it must reside in the
norm itself. What I am saying goes against the well-known Humean interpretation of our moral obligation to follow the requirements of justice
(Hume 1751). This moral obligation is, according to Hume, conditional
on the expectation that others are following the norms of justice too. ·
In my interpretation, Hume's requirements ofjustice are social norms,
because they fulfill my conditions for a social norm to exist. What distinguishes norms of justice from other social norms is that 'i:nany of us
would have a conditional preference for abiding by such norms because
we acknowledge that the normative expectations expressed by Condition
2(b) are legitimate and should therefore be satisfied. Their legitimacy may
stem from recognizing how important it is for the good functioning of our
society to have such norms, but of course their ongoing value depends on
widespread conformity. There is nothing inherently good in our fairness
norms, above and beyond their role in regulating our ways of allocating
and distributing goods and privileges according to the basic structure of
our society.U However, many of us would feel there is something inher- .
ently bad in taking a life, especially when the victim is a close kin. All
known societies have developed similar rules against killing one's kin
or mating with one's parents. The unconditional preference most of us
have for not committing such acts may have an evolutionary origin, and
typically contemplating killing or incest elicits a strong, negative emotional response of repugnance. What needs to be stressed here is that
what makes something a social or a moral norm is our attitude toward
it. 12 How we justifY our conditional or unconditional allegiance has no
bearing on the reality ofthe distinction, and the latter is all that matters
to my definition of social norms.
Condition 2 also helps in distinguishing a social norm from a collective
habit. People in Pittsburgh wear coats in winter. I expect them to keep
11

12

The fact that 'fair' allocations reflect the structure of society is well known to anthropologists. In traditional, authoritarian societies, for example, the allocation of goods is
based on rank. Such allocations are accepted by all the involved parties as just (Fiske

1992).
Our attitudes are also shaped in part by the norms that we internalize, which results in
a positive feedback loop between attitudes and adherence to norms.
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wearing coats in winter and, were anypne interested in my attire, I would
say they expect me to wear a coat in winter. But these expectations have no
bearing on my decision to wear a coat. There is no connection between
my preference for wearing a coat and my expectations about the rest
of the population. My not wearing a coat in winter may violate their
expectations, and it may cause surprise and puzzlement, but does it matter
to my choice? It does not, because I have independent reasons to wear a
coat in winter. Condition 2 instead tells that my preference for conformity
depends on the expectation that others conform, and either the belief that
they expect me to conform or the belief that they also prefer me to
conform (and may sanction my behavior). Using the language-of game
theory, we may say that compliance with R is not a strictly dominant
strategy. 13 If it were, one would want to follow R irrespective of one's
expectation about others' behavior.
Taken together, the conditions I have stated tell us that social norms
motivate action, but they do so only indirectly. The direct, underlying
motives are the beliefs and desires that support the norm. Thus the presence of a norm of reciprocity, and its salience in a particular situation,
motivate me to act in a congruent manner, but my behavior is ultim'!tely
explainable only by reference to my preferences and expectations. This
statement should not be surprising to those who adopt a methodological
individualist perspective. In this perspective, a norm is a social construct
reducible to the beliefs and desires of those involved in its practice; if
individuals for some reason stopped having those beliefs and desires, the
norm would cease to exist.
The conditions for a norm to exist entail, when they are fulfilled, that
a social norm is an equilibrium. First, let me briefly define the notion of
equilibrium as it is widely used in the social sciences. An equilibrium is a
situation that involves several individuals or groups, in which each one's
action is a best reply to everyone else's action. It is a situation of stable
mutual adjustment: Everyone anticipates everyone else's behavior, and all
these anticipations turn out to be correct. In other words, an equilibrium
is a set of self-fulfilling prophecies that individuals formulate about each
other's actions. Social norms, as I stated before, have no reality other
than our beliefs that others behave according to them and e~pect us to

behave according to them. In equilibrium, such beliefs are confirmed
by experience and thus they become more and more ingrained as time
goes on. A norm of reciprocity is supported by our beliefs that people will
comply with it, and that they expect us to comply with it too. Each time
we reCiprocate we.strengt!J.en the norm and confirm those expectations.
In equilibrium everyone reciprocates and is right to do so. But there
could also be another equilibrium in which nobody reciprocates. If people expected no reciprocity, there would be no trust in the first place, and
again expectations would be self-fulfilling: Everyone would distrust and
would be right to do so, because nobody would reciprocate. A situation
in which some reciprocate and some do not would not be stable, for the
second group might learn that they would do better by reciprocating, and
thus switch their strategy (or the first group might learn not to reciprocate, and change their strategy). In some recent work on norm emergence
(Bicchieri et al. 2004), I looked at how a norm of trust/reciprocity can
emerge in a situation in which different groups display different behaviors, and how they may solidify into an equilibrium. For now, let us agree
that social norms, those bundles of self-fulfilling expectations we live by,
are equilibria.
If a social norm is followed, then by definition individuals' expectations are self-fulfilling, in the sense that the combination of empirical
and normative expectations [Conditions 2(a) and 2(b) or 2(b')] give
one a reason to obey the norm. What sort of reason is this? As I already
mentioned, I believe different people may have different reasons for compliance that extend beyond the standard reasons given by many social
scientists, namely, that we fear punishment when we disobey a norm. It is
certainly possible that some may fear the consequences of violating others' normative expectations, because violation may trigger resentment
and unpleasant consequences for the transgressor. 14 Such individuals
would be motivated to follow a norm to avoid negative sanctions. Yet
I would argue that another reason for compliance is the desire to please
others by doing something others expect and prefer one to do. In this
case, the expectation of a positive sanction would be a reason for compliance. A third reason for compliance with a norm is that one accepts
others' normative expectations as well founded. In this case, sanctions
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A (strictly) dominant strategy is a strategy that gives the individual who chooses it a
better payoff (usually expressed in utility) than any other available strategy. In a gametheoretic context, a (strictly) dominant strategy gives a better payoff than any otl1er
available strategy independently of what the other players do.

This is often tile case when members of group A impose certain norms on members of
group B (the target group). In tl1is case most members ofB would conform out offear
of punishment or because of tile desire to be rewarded for good behavior. Conditions
2(a) and 2(b') would in this case refer to expectations about the targeted members of P
only.
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have no weight. If I recognize your expectations as reasonable, I have a
reason to fulfill them. I may still be tempted to do something else contrary to your expectations, but then I would have to justifY (if only to
myself) my choice by offering alternative good reasons and show how
they trump your reasons. This need to offer a justification (to myself as
well as others) signals that I recognize others' expectations as cogent. The
acceptance of others' expectations as legitimate is usually accompanied
by the recognition that negative sanctions against transgressors are also
legitimate. If your expectation is reasonable, I must also acknowledge
that it is reasonable for you to punish my transgression, even if the reprimand is nothing more than an expression of disapproval of my behavior.
The common observation that norm transgression is often accompanied
by punishment (or the expectation of punishment) does not entail that
norms are only supported by sanctions, in the sense that if sanctions were
not there, conformity would be entirely absent. Recognizing punishment
as legitimate is different from acknowledging that, de facto, violations are
punished. The latter does not involve understanding conformity expectations as valid, whereas the former presupposes the acceptance of a norm.
It is important to acknowledge that different individuals may need different normative expectations in order to be prepared to obey a norm, and
that an individual may follow some norms, but not others, in the·absence
of any expected sanction. 15
Fear and the desire to please are powerful motives, but they imply that
a norm would only be followed in circumstances in which either there is
monitoring of one's actions and sanctioning is possible (as in repeated
interaction) or there is some way to ensure that one's action is acknowledged by the people one wants to please or else has a noticeable effect on
theirwell-being. 16 Under anonymity conditions, and when one's action
effects are insignificant (as when contributing to some public goods),
the motivation to obey a norm would falter. A possible objection to this
conclusion is that we may feel guilt at violating a norm, and the emotion
of guilt supports conformity even in the absence of external monitoring
and sanctioning (Elster 1989). According to this view, emotions directly
cause conformity. But why and when do we feel guilt? Imagine a situation in which someone does not expect others to conform to a practice
of truth-telling. He has observed people openly lying and has been lied

often enough to expect further dishonesty. Yet he is made to believe
:at he is expected to conform to a norm of truth-telling. It is likely that
this individual would consider the expectation illegitimate, and he would
feel no guilt at violating it. Guilt, as well as resentment, presuppose the
violation of expectations-we consider legitimate. It is irrational to resent a
alfunctioning computer, but it is reasonable to resent the seller if we
~ink he should have known (and told us) the computer was defective.
We trusted him, and he flouted our legitimate expectations of honesty
and good faith. Guilt and resentment signal that a social norm is in place
and that mutual conformity expectations are legitimate. It is reasonable
to feel guilt or resentment precisely because there is a norm, a set of
mutual expectations that we recognize should be met. The existence of
an accepted norm that one contemplates violating is the source of guilt,
but it is the recognized legitimacy of mutual normative expectations, not
the emotion of guilt, that motivates conformity.
Notice that I am not postulating a generic desire to meet, whenever
. possible, other people's expectations. In his analysis of conventions, Sugden (2000) assumed we possess a 'natural aversion' toward acting contrary to the preferences (and expectations) of others. This propensity
may be true for the preferences and expectations of fumily and friends,
but it is hardly at work with strangers. As social distance increases, we tend
to care less and less for others' preferences and expectations, especially
when these preferences and expectations run counter to other interests
we have. Sugden's assumption would restrict norm-abiding behavior to
a circle of fumily and friends, but these are precisely the circumstances
where norms are not needed. In large, anonymous groups, if we do not
want to act contrary to others' normative expectations, it must be because
we find such expectations reasonable. The acceptance of others' normative expectations as reasonable is the third kind of motive to conform to a
social norm I mentioned before. This need not be a motive for everyone,
but in all cases in which anonymity and the absence of sanctions tempt us
to defect, for a norm to survive there must be a critical number of people
for which such r~asons have power.
Since social norms often go against our self-interest, especially ifwe narrowly interpret it as a desire for material possessions, a social norm need
not be an equilibrium of an ordinary game in which payoffs represent
self-interested preferences. Thus, for example, a cooperative norm cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the PD game represented in Figure LIP If

24

15

16

In Chapter 3, I discuss the differences we observe in the behavior of Proposers in Ultimatum versus Dictator games.
Individuals differ as to the scope of people they want to plea.se. Most of us stop at family
and friends, but some may include acquaintances and even strangers.
j
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A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that each
player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies played by the other players.
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such a norm exists and is followed, however, the original PD game would
be transformed (at least for the norm followers) into the subsequent,
very different game shown in Figure 1.6.
In the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma game, each player's preference
ranking is DC> CC > DD >CD. As before, B stands for 'best,' S for 'second
best,' and so on. In the symmetric game of Figure 1.6 instead, each norm
follower's preference ranking is CC > DD >DC > CD. That is, the players
who follow a cooperative norm will do it because their empirical and
normative expectations have been met and hence they prefer to obey the
norm. The new game in Figure 1.6 is a coordination game with two strict
Nash equilibria, one of which is Pareto superior to the other.l 8 •19 When
a norm of cooperation is obeyed, a game like the PD of Figure 1.1 is
transformed into a coordination game: Players' payoffs in the new game will
differ from the payoffs of the original game, because their preferences ·
and beliefs will be as in Conditions 2, 2(a), and 2(b) or 2(b') previously·
outlined. Indeed, if a player knows that a cooperative norm exists and
expects a sizeable part of the population to follow it, then, provided she
also believes she is expected (and maybe also preferred) to follow such
norm, she will have a preference to conform to the norm in~ situation in
which she has the choice to cooperate or to defect. Note tliat what I am
saying implies that a social norm, unlike a convention, is never a solution
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In a strict Nash equilibrium each player's strategy is a unique best reply to the other
players' strategies. This means that a strict Nash equilibrium cannot include weakly
dominated strategies.
A coordination game is a game in which there are at least two Nash equilibria in pure
strategies, and players have a mutual interest in reaching one of these equilibria (CC or
DD in Figure 1.6), even if different players may prefer different equilibria (which is not
the case in Figure 1.6).
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A Bayesian game

of an original coordination game, though it is an equilibrium of the new,
.
transformed game it creates.
It is important to recall that my definition of social norm does not entail
that everybody conforms. In fact, the definition says that a social norm may
exist and not be followed. For some, the PD game of Figure 1.1 is never
transformed into any other game. And even a person who starts playing
a coordination game like the one in Figure 1.6 may revert to playing the
regular PD game if she realizes that Condition 2 (a) (empirical expectations)
is violated. Let me clarifY this point with a simple example. Suppose an
actor is faced with a finitely repeated PD, and suppose the situation is
such that a 'cooperative' norm is primed. 20 The player knows there exists
a cooperative norm that applies to this kind of situation. The player also
knows that there are several types of players, some of which would not see
the game as he does. To make matters easy, suppose there are two types
of players, those who simply see the game as a PD and those who follow
a cooperative norm. 21 In this case we may model the choice situation as
a Bayesian game (Figure 1.7) in which Nature picks a player type with a
given probability, so that with prior probability p the opponent one faces
20
21

In Chapter 4 I discuss in detail how such 'cooperative' norms might be primed.
In a finitely repeated game, even a 'selfish' player may want to cooperate for a while, if
it is not common knowledge that all players are rational and selfish (Krep~ eta!. 19~2).
This consideration, however, has no, bearing on my argument because, until a defection
is observed, a player cannot distinguish between a forward-thinking selfish type and a
true cooperator.
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is playing a coordination game, and with probability (1 - p) he is playing
a PD game. 22 If a norm-follower assesses a sufficiently high probability to
being matched with a similar type, he will cooperate. 23
When faced with a defection, however, the player will reassess his probabilities and possibly revert to playing the equilibrium strategy (defect)
for the traditional PD game. One might thus say that the existence of a norm
always presents a conditional follower with a Bayesian game: If the normative and empirical expectations conditions are fulfilled, she will assess
a higher probability to being matched with a similar player type (a norm
follower) and act accordingly. But she must also be prepared to revise
her probabilistic assessment in case experience contravenes her previous
expectations. 24 Note that the existence of a social norm facilitates equilibrium selection in the Bayesian game fuced by the conditional norm followers. If the probability of being matched with a similar type is high enough,
C,C is the selected equilibrium; otherwise D,D will be selected. (Appendix
1 presents a formal treatment of a norm-based utility function and
the conditions under which a PD game becomes a coordination game.)
This simple and elegant game-theoretic model offers a language, built
on the notions of belief and preference, in which to cast what we commonly observe: In an experimental setting in which repetitions of a PDlike game are allowed, we witness high initial levels of cooperatio~. Yet
cooperation precipitously declines as soon as some players defect (Fehr
and Gachter 2000a). Whether a game-theoretic model provides an acceptable explanation for what we observe depends in part on our willingness
to take 'as if models seriously, which in turn relates to the possibility of
drawing interesting predictions from them. In the case at hand, people
may not be aware of their preferences and never have made a probabilistic assessment of the situation; yet, if we take their behavior to reveal
certain dispositions, we may predict that, ceteris paribus, factors that we
expect will change their expectations will have a measurable effect on
future choices.

22
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When players are uncertain as to the type of player they are facing, they will assess some
probability that the other player is of a certain type. Typically the list of all possible
types and their prior probability of occurring in the population are taken to be common
knowledge among the players (Harsanyi 1967, 1968).
If players use an availability heuristic to come to this probability assessment, the probability of playing a coordination game might initially be much higher. That is, if a player
is the type who follows a cooperative norm, he tends to believe there is a high probability
that others are like him.
This revision is governed by a "learning rule." I discuss one such rule in Chapter 6.
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Descriptive Norms
Let us now look at how the definition of social norms given above differentiates several types of social constructs and behaviors that are often
lumped together. Sometime~ 'norm' means what people commonly do in
certain situations, what constitutes 'normal' or 'regular' behavior. This
notion of regular behavior differs in important respects both from a
shared habit and from what people believe ought to be done, what is
socially approved or disapproved. The regular behaviors I am referring
to, and their influence on people's choices, have been extensively studied
by social psychologists, most notably Cialdini et al. (1990), who dubbed
them descriptive norms. Examples of descriptive norms are all sorts of
fashions and fuds, in addition to the many collective behaviors that people (rightly or wrongly) deem to convey important information about
the surrounding world. Conventions, as we shall see, are a kind of descriptive norm, but not all descriptive norms become stable conventions. Note
that there is no intrinsic property of a behavioral pattern that makes it
a descriptive norm: What is a descriptive norm for one group may be
an entrenched social norm for another. Dress codes are a case in point.
For the office workers at a particular firm, a 'dress-down Friday' informal
rule is nothing more than a fashion code that, though widely adopted,
remains entirely discretionary. For teenage members of a Los Angeles
gang, on the contrary, a dress code may signal group loyalty, so much so
that every member is expected to rigidly adhere to the code and transgressions are punished. What makes a collective behavior a descriptive or
a social norm are the expectations and motives of the people involved.
This point is worth emphasizing: It is the way we relate to behavioral rules
by way of preferences and expectations that gives them their identity as
habits, norms, or mere conventions.
We conform to social norms because we have reasons to fulfill others' normative expectations. These reasons often conflict with our selfinterest, at least narrowly defined. Conformity to descriptive norms is, on
the contrary, always dictated by self-interest: We conform because such
norms make life easier for us, because we want to 'fit in' or do the right
thing- as when we adopt a new fashion- or simply because they provide
evidence of what is likely to be effective, adaptive behavior, as when we
bought Internet stocks because many people we know were buying them
and were doing well. Often there are good prudential or informational
reasons to "do as the Romans do." Conformity to a descriptive norm
may be motivated by a desire to imitate others' behavior in uncertain or
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ambiguous situations. In such circumstances, others' behavior provides us
with information about the appropriate course of action, as when a young
employee imitates older, more experienced colleagues' way of,handling
complaints. Imitation may be a reasonable, cost-effective choice, provided
we believe that the majority's behavior or opinion conveys the information we lack. There are many occasions in which we have to make a quick
decision without much information about the environment: Gathering
information may be unfeasible or have too high an opportunity cost in
terms of resources (such as time and money) that one would more effectively employ elsewhere. Or we may be in a condition in which the wrong
decision could have serious consequences, and we lack the expertise
to properly evaluate the situation. Conversely, there are circumstances
in which the consequences of a decision are not too important, and
here again gathering information seems a waste of resources. In all these
cases, we look at the choices other people make as a guide to our own
choices. ·while this may seem like a good deal for the actors at the time,
it can ultimately mean all actors depend on the choices of one (or a few)
first mover(s), and those choices may or may not be good ones. This
type of 'informational cascade' (Banerjee 1992) may be the reason why
some inefficient descriptive norms emerge and persist, as I will discuss in
Chapter 5.
For now let me stress that conformity to a descriptive norm need not
involve an obligation or normative expectations: We do not feel any group
pressure to conform, nor do we believe that others expect us to comply
with what appears to be a collective behavior. Deviation from the 'norm'
is not punished, nor is compliance overtly approved. For example, if
I decide - alone among my friends and co-workers - not to invest my
retirement money in stocks, I do not expect to be blamed or ostracized.
At worst, they will think I am overly cautious. A crucial feature of descriptive norms is thus that they entail unilateral expectations. Though we may
have come to expect others to follow a regular behavioral pattern, we
do not feel any social pressure to conform. That is, Conditiop.s 1, 2, and
2(a) apply but Conditions 2(b) and 2(b') do not. In most cases of descriptive norms, there simply are no reciprocal expectations: We do not believe
others care about our choices or expect us to follow any particular behavior. When I choose to adopt a new fashion, I usually do not think I am
expected to follow it. But even in those cases in which we are aware that we
might be expected to follow the majority's decision or opinion, we do not
count on being blamed if we follow a different path. Others may think it
would be prudent or reasonable for us to behave as they do (for example,

ick a certain stock portfolio), but the 'ought' involved in stating prutoP
· very different
·
f rom a normative
· ough t. I mig
· h t recogdential reasons IS
. the reasonableness of others' expectations, but not their legitimacy.
nize
.
. th'
.
c:
I'
Fulfilling others' expectations m IS case IS not a reason .tOr comp Ie ~hereas expecting a-majority of people to behave in a given way
anc,
is a necessary reason to adopt that behavior. It is only a necessary reason,
however, because one must also have a conditional preference for conforming. Expectations alone cannot motivate a choice: My choice to conform
depends on expecting a majority of people to conform, but it must be
that I prefer to follow such 'normal' behavior on condition that it is
the majority's behavior. This latter condition differentiates a descriptive
norm from a collective habit: In the example of wearing a coat in the
Pittsburgh winter, I have an independent reason (and thus a preference)
to wear a coat, irrespective of what other people do. But in the case of
a new fashion, following it depends on one's perception of what other
people do. Mter Mary Quant introduced the miniskirt in the 1960s, it
probably took a small number of trendsetters to reach a critical mass
and start what became a major change in women's fashion. That critical
mass of women, however, was crucial in determining the success of the
new attire: Most women would not have started wearing a miniskirt if not
for the sense that it was now 'in' and many celebrities were wearing it. It
should be noted that often it is the perception of a critical mass, rather than
a real critical mass, that tips the balance in favor of the new behavior. A
small but vocal minority, or an endorsement by some celebrity, may thus
be enough to induce a change in mass behavior.
The conditional preference for conformity may be dictated, among
other things, by a desire to 'fit in' or be fashionable, or just by prudential
reasons; it does not, however, spring from a desire to fulfill other people's
expectations or from fear of being punished if one does not meet them.
For a descriptive norm to exist, the following conditions must be met.
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Conditions far a Descriptive Norm to Exist
Let Rbe a behavioral rule for situations of typeS, where Sis a coordination
game. We say that Ris a descriptive norm in a population Pifthere exists
a sufficiently large subset Per ~ P such that, for each individual i E Pcf,
l. Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of
typeS;
2. Conditional preference: iprefers to conform to Rin situations of typeS
on the condition that:
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(a) Empirical expectations: ibelieves that a sufficiently large subset of
P conforms to R in situations of type S.

Others
M

A descriptive norm is followed by population Pif there exists a sufficiently large subset Pc ~Pee such that, for all i E Pr, Condition 2(a) is met
for i and as a result i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S.
A descriptive norm thus tells what a person would do if he had certain
expectations. For instance, "walk on the left side of the sidewalk" and
"walk on the right side of the sidewalk" are both descriptive norms. Some
people may follow the first rule (because they expect others to do the
same), some people may follow the second rule (again, because they
expect others to do the same), and some people may follow neither rule
(because they do not expect a sufficient number of other people to walk
on a specific side of the sidewalk). Even in a society where one of the
rules has been conventionalized, it is clear that the other rule still exists
as a possibility: I drive on the right side of the road, but if I observed
large numbers of people driving on the left side of a particular road, my
expectations would change and I would con,sider driving on the left side
of that road.
As in the case of social norms, the preference for conformity is qmditional, but this time it is only conditional on expecting others to follow
the behavioral rule in a given class of situations. Note that a descriptive
norm that is followed is an equilibrium, in the sense that followers' beliefs
will be self-fulfilling: If one believes R to be widely followed, then it is in
one's interest to follow R, too. Thus, if enough people come to believeR
is the 'norm,' they will behave in ways that further validate those beliefs.
The conditional preference for conformity may be driven by the desire
to imitate those we believe are more informed or by the hope of 'fitting
in' a group we value. Or it may simply be the wish of doing what we think
most people do. Be it as it may, a preference for conformity depends on
expecting others to conform to R.
If a descriptive norm is an equilibrium, what sort of game is it an ~qui
librium of? Consider again the miniskirt fashion: In this case, a woman
has several choices of attire, of which the miniskirt is one. Assume for
simplicity that there are only three possible types of clothes women can
choose from: M (miniskirt), L (long skirt), and P (pants). Assume also
that a woman already has L and P in her wardrobe, and has to decicJ.e
whether to buy and wear M. The choice of M is thus more costly than L
or P, but she prefers above all to be fashionable. Her choice matrix would
look like the one in Figure 1.8.
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FIGURE 1.8.

An Imitation game

Notice that the payoffs of 'Others' need not be the same as the payoffs
of 'Self.' Indeed, suppose 'Others' are the trendsetters that start a new
fushion. I assume the trendsetters will not care whether 'Self' follows
the new fashion; what the trendsetters care about is self-expression, and
starting a new fashion is not their goal [M may have a higher payoff
(2) for trendsetters because they always prefer to do the 'new' thing].
'Self' instead wants to imitate the trendsetters; hence she cares about
whether she coordinates with 'Others.' Because 'Others' may not care at
all about being imitated, the three Nash equilibria of the game are not
strict. Imitation is a one-sided coordination game. 25 Even if the choice
of M is more costly than P or L for 'Self' (it has a lower payoff), if it
is believed that now "it is in wearing miniskirts," the imitators' choices
will converge to M. The example shows that a descriptive norm may be a
suboptimal equilibrium and still be the one chosen by the players. It also
shows that the class of games of which descriptive norms are equilibria is
much larger than the class of coordination games of which conventions
are equilibria. As I shall discuss shortly, the latter are always coordination
games without nonstrict Nash equilibria and for that reason, in such
games, all players prefer that everybody conforms. Such preferences are
-absent in a descriptive norm.
Earlier I represented social norms as coordination games, too. There
is a crucial difference, though. The existence of a social norm transforms a
game like the Prisoner's Dilemma (oranyothermixed-motive game) into
25

Note that 'most other women' need not refer to an entire population or even a large
group. Some descriptive norms are exclusive, in that they signal belonging to a special,
selected group. Fashion may play that role on occasion.
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a coordination game (or a Bayesian game, in which we may be playing a
coordination game with a given probability), by providing actors with an
alternative set of expectations and preferences. But the problem that a
social norm is solving in the first place is never a coordination problem. If
I expect everybody to cooperate, to be fair, or to reciprocate favors, I may
be tempted not to, and only a desire to fulfill others' expectations may
induce me not to stray. This desire may spring from fear, benevolence,
or the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of others' reasons and expectations. Social norms by and large apply to situations in which there is a
conflict between selfish and pro-social incentives. In contrast, descriptive
norms solve a preexisting coordination problem (even if it is a unilateral
one, as in imitation). If so, following a descriptive norm is not in opposition to self-interest. Indeed, it is usually in one's self-interest (however
narrowly defined) to follow a descriptive norm. In sum, we may say that
a descriptive norm is always an equilibrium strategy of an original coordination game. In a given situation S, a descriptive norm is followed if
and only if the players of the coordination game expect (with sufficiently
high probability) a particular equilibrium strategy to be played, and thus
they play that strategy as well. 26
Note that the game-theoretic representation is silent about the dynamics leading to one particular equilibrium. We still need a plausible story
about the dynamics that led women to adopt en masse the miniskirt. For
the moment, however, this should not be a matter of concern; for now all
we want to answer are questions about conformity and norm elicitation.

condemned, sanctioned, or accompanied by guilt. Not following the convention simply means the trader will not be able to communicate what
she wants and lose an opportunity to gain. When a convention is in place,
expe<.:tations of compliance are mutuaL An actor expects others to follow
the convention, ami she also believes she is expected to follow it by the
other participants in the conventional practice. The traders expect each
otherto follow the signaling convention, as much as we normally expect a
competent speaker to stick to the rules of English usage. Yet such mutual
expectations are never a sufficient reason to adhere to a convention. It
must be that one has a conditional preference for coordinating and communicating with others, as failure to coordinate and communicate comes
with a personal cost.
David Lewis first defined conventions as equilibria of coordination
games (Lewis 1969). According to Lewis, a convention is a regular pattern
of behavior that is a strict Nash equilibrium in a coordination game with
n::: 2 strict Nash equilibria.27 ThiS requirement is meant to capture the
arbitrariness of conventions, in particular the awareness on the part of
those participating in a convention that there are possible alternative
arrangements. In a coordination game, the interests of the participants
may or may not perfectly coincide. In the miniskirt example, all the followers had the same (ordinal) preferences. In the game in Figure 1. 9, instead,
the players' interests do not exactly coincide. What matters though is that
everyone does better by coordinating with the choices of other players
than by 'going sofo.'
The game in Figure 1.9 can be interpreted as a situation in which
two people want to coordinate or 'be together,' but one would prefer to
go to the Opera whereas the other prefers playing Golf. The game has
two strict Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (Golf, Golf) and (Opera,
Opera), and a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which 'Other' chooses Golf
with probability 1/3 and Opera with probability 2/3, and 'Self' chooses
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Conventions
Descriptive norms, such as fashions and fads, can wane rather quickly,
but some of them may crystallize into stable conventions, such as signaling
systems or dressing codes. Such conventions are useful b~cause they coordinate our expectations and often act as signals that facilitate interaction
and communication. Usually no intrinsic value is attributed to a convention, although violating it can be costly, as the cost is directly related to
the consequences of breaching a coordination mechanism. For example, the trader on the stock exchange floor signals with her fing~rs how
many shares she wants to buy or sell. The failure to do so is not socially
26

A definition of descriptive norms that requires them to be followed would limit descriptive
norms to a time-varying and imprecisely defined subset of the equilibria and would also
make it hard to talk about equilibrium strategies that are not currently being played.

27
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Lewis's account of convention is quite different from mine, and it runs as follows (p. 78):
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in
a recurrent situation Sis a canvention if .and only if it is true that, and it is common
knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among members of P, (1) almost
everyone conforms to R; (2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform
toR; (3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible
combinations of actions; (4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R,
on condition that almost everyone conforms toR; (5) almost everyone would prefer that
~ny one more conform toR 1 , on condition that almost everyone conform to R 1 , where R 1
some possible regularity in the behavior of members of PinS, such that almost no one
ln almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R' and to R.

:s
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FIGURE 1.9.

A Coordination game

Golf with probability 2/3 and Opera with probability 1/3. Clearly the
preferences of the players are not identical. They do, however, prefer to
be together rather than be separate. The players may settle on one of
the equilibria for whatever reason, but once they are in equilibrium, they
have no incentive to deviate from it. 28 When I say that a convention is 'selfsustaining,' I just mean that each actor has a self-interested motivation to
conform to the convention.
The matrix in Figure 1.9 does not tell us which equilibrium is played,
because it all depends on the expectations players bring to the game.
Thus 'Self may have to settle for Golf, if he expects 'Other' to make
that choice, and vice versa. But how are these expectations justified? This
is a well-known problem in game theory: Even if players have common
knowledge of the structure of the game and of their mutual rationality,.
usually this information is not sufficient to select a particular equilibrium
strategy (Bicchieri 1993). In this case, we must introduce some salience
criterion of choice, and common knowledge thereof, to solve the equilibrium selection problem. Salience may be provided by precedent or by
an explicit agreement. Lewis (1969) unambiguously referred to precedent as a mechanism by which players succeed in coordinating on oneparticular equilibrium. Schelling (1960), on the other hand, referred
to focal points. However, salience and focal points are not satisf~ctory
solutions, because for them to do their coordination job it must be common knowledge among the players that they describe the game in the
same way; but unless it is explicitly assumed, there is no reason to believe
that common knowledge exists. This interpretation of the coordination
28

An ~ccou?t_o~ how a convention emerges would look at repetitions of the stage game
depiCted m Figure 1.9. The convention in this case might be that people alternate
between Golf and Opera, or that they do one or the other with fixed probabilities.
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arne in Figure 1.9 is a static, stylized description of the conditions under
!hich a convention is likely to emerge, not an analysis of how players attain
common knowledge of the shared criteria that will help them solve their
coordination problem.
Another possible-interpretation of the game in Figure 1.9 is that one
of the two equilibria has already been selected and consequently a convention is in place. 'Self will know, for example, that in situations of
type S almost everyone chooses to play golf. She thus has an empirical
expectation about what 'Other' will do and a conditional preference for
conformity given her expectation. In this case 'Self will conform and, if
'Other' has a similar expectation and preference, he will follow the established convention, too. In this case no common knowledge is necessary
for players to play the 'play golf' equilibrium: First-order expectations are
all that is needed. This interpretation of the game refers to the survival of
a convention: A convention persists if agents have the right kind of empirical expectations. The question now becomes how agents come to form
such expectations, or reason inductively from past cases. For example,
when 'Self is faced with situation s, she will look for analogies with past
situations she has experienced and eventually decide there are enough
relevant similarities to categorizes as a member of S, the class of situations
to which a given behavioral regularity applies. The next step for 'Self' is to
decide that that particular behavioral regularity can be projected as a genuine regularity; otherwise she would have no reason to expect it to persist.
Sugden and Cubitt (2003) point out how Lewis explicitly recognized that
inductive inferences are crucial in maintaining a convention and offer a
formal model of Lewis's informal description of how common knowledge
that a behavioral regularity will persist is attained. Without entering into
the details of Sugden and Cubitt's formal reconstruction of Lewis's argument, let me point out that Lewis's argument is crucially dependent on
'!-Ssuming shared inductive standards, and one of these standards is the
:ommon recognition that only certain behavioral patterns can be proJected. In the next chapter I address the problem of what grounds inductive inferences (especially inferences about social behavior); for now let
~e point out that a game-theoretic account of norms and conventions,
~nsofar as it describes them as equilibria of particular types of games,
Is both inescapably static and epistemically inadequate. Not only do we
need dynamic accounts ofhow norms and conventions emerge, but also
a better understanding of the kinds of cognitive capabilities that allow us
~0 recognize and project behavioral patterns as such. I will address both
rssu es m
· later chapters.
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All we need to emphasize for the moment is that a convention is
realized equilibrium of an original coordination game without
Nash equilibria, and that it is in a player's self-interest to stick to it. We
now ready to give a more precise definition of convention that
captures its characteristic features.
Conditions for Conventions to Exist
A descriptive norm is a convention if there exists a sufficiently
subset Pf £ P such that, for each individual i E Pr, the
conditions hold:

1. Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of
conforms to R in situations of type Sand
2. Sis a coordination game without nonstrict Nash equilibria.
Recall that, for a descriptive norm to be followed, empirical "'v''"'"'''•~
tions [Condition 2(a)] had to be met. Hence, a convention is always
followed descriptive norm, because empirical expectations are met
is, the follower of a convention always expects a sufficiently large subset
of Pto conform. Note that a descriptive norm could be a nonstrict Nash
equilibrium; a follower could imitate a trendsetter, but the latter would
not be interested in coordinating with the 'followers.' In the case of a
convention, instead, there is no such indifference.
There are several important differences between conventions and
social norms. One is that conventions, in order to exist, have to be followed. Social norms (and descriptive norms) instead can exist without
being followed. Second, one conforms to a convention because of the
belief that others behave in the expected way, because it makes sense
to follow a convention only if there is reasonable certainty that i~ is still
in place. Conforming to a social norm, on the contrary, require's that
both normative and empirical expectations are met. Because conventions
do not run counter to selfish motives, but social norms often ~do, if only
empirical expectations were fulfilled, one would have a reason to follow a
convention, but he would be seriously tempted not to conform to a social
norm. In both cases, the players are playing a coordination game without
nonstrict Nash equilibria, but whereas a convention solves an original
coordination game, a norm transforms (with a certain probability) an
original mixed-motive game into a coordination game and at the same
time helps players to select one equilibrium.
·
The neat boundaries I drew between descriptive norms, conventions,
and social norms are quite blurred in real life: Often what is a convention
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roe is a social norm to others, and what starts as a descriptive norm
.
in tiroe become a stable social norm. Sometimes (but by no means
mar
£
£
.
always) the passage is marked by the presence of a new pre erence or umsal conformity. In the trading example, the trader does not prefer that
verry. other trader- follow that specific signaling convention. Of course,
ev.e
'f
she prefers that there is a signaling system, but she does not care 1 some
traders do not follow it (provided the system is still in place). If another
trader suddenly decides to make different signals, he is the only one to
bear the cost of deviating from the conventional sign language. The case
of traffic rules, the quintessential example of a convention, is quite different. Driving according to .'personal' rules may cause severe damage. The
reckless driver is prone to cause accidents involving other people, who
tlms have to bear the costs of his infraction. When breaking a convention
creates negative externalities, people prefer not just that the convention
is in place, but also that everyone follows it. Such violations are usually
legally sanctioned, but, even more importantly, they are also informally
sanctioned by society. A reckless driver is blamed as irresponsible: We
tllink he should have observed traffic rules. When breaking a coordination mechanism produces negative externalities, we may expect conventions to become full social norms.
A good example of such a transformation would be the stag-hunt game
(Hume 1739). In this game, the hunters could coordinate their efforts
and get a stag, which is a much bigger and valuable prey than a hare,
which they co~ld hunt alone and get with certainty. The game can be
represented as shown in Figure 1.10.
If the players agree to hunt the stag together, they may get a better
payoff (2) than hunting alone ( 1). However, even if a stag-hunting convention is in place, the larger the number of hunters, the higher the
tO SO
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FIGURE 1.10.

The stag-hunt game
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probability that someone might deviate from it. The (Stag, Stag)
rium, though Pareto dominant, is risky because, if someone deviates
it, Self risks remaining empty-handed. The (Hare, Hare) equilibrium
risk-dominant, because by hunting hares alone success is guarantee
Thus, if p (Others play S) is greater or equal to 1/2, Self will
Stag; otherwise she will choose Hare. In this case the players might
to impose sanctions on the lone hunters, especially when the
group is small and even a single deviation risks preventing the stag
being successfully hunted. 'What started as a convention may thus in
become a full social norm.
This does not mean that a social norm is in place because it prevents
ative externalities from occurring. Many social norms are not the oultCc)mle
of a plan or a conscious decision to enact them; they emerge by
action but not by human design. Some conventions may not involve
nalities, at least initially, but they may become so well entrenched that
ple start attaching value to them. For example, a group of people
routinely avoid smoking before there arises a consensus disapproving
behavior. Once a public consensus is reached, smoking incurs new
Not only would one be expected not to smoke, but the occasional
would incur the blame of the entire group. At this point, a social norm
born. It may also happen that some conventions lend themselves to
poses they did not have when they were established. Norbert Elias
illustrated how rules of etiquette, such as proper ways to eat and
developed to become a sign of aristocratic upbringing and reiinc~men
and were effectively used to exclude those who did not belong to
ruling class. Thus a thirteenth-century peasant, and even a city
would be excused if he slurped with his spoon when in company,
from the dish, or gnawed a bone and then put it back on the comm
dish. It would have come as no surprise if the ill-bred blew his nose in
tablecloth, poked his teeth with the knife, and slobbered while he
but no nobleman was allowed such lack of manners. Definitions of"v'-«""'
unacceptable behavior, or 'coarse manners,' were uniformly shared
thirteenth-century writings on table manners- simultaneously
ing in Italy, Germany, and England - that recorded for the first time
long-standing oral tradition reflecting what was customary in society.
standard of good behavior promoted in these works is the behavior of
aristocracy, the courtly cir:cles gathering around the great feudal lords
Social differences were much more important than they are today,
29

For a definition of risk-dominance, see Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
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theY were given unambiguous expression in social conduct. Because at
that time eating together was a significant moment of socialization, table
manners came to play an essential role in shaping the identity of the aristocracy. A member of the ruling class was identified as such through his
'courtesy' or good manners._Had he not respected the rules of etiquette,
he would have been met with contempt and perceived as threatening the
established class boundaries.
Another example of a convention that evolved to become an important social signaling device is footbinding in China (Mackie 1996). The
practice of footbinding might have been invented by a dancer in the
palace of the Southern T'ang emperor, or it may have originated among
slave traders as a restraint on female slaves, but it soon spread to all but
the lowest classes in the population, becoming a sign of gentility and
modesty and an essential condition for marriage. A family that did not
impose such painful mutilation on its female children would have come
to signal, among other things, a dange~ous disregard for tradition and
custom. As a consequence, it would have been ostracized and its young
females regarded as unsuitable mates. Given enough time, what starts as a
descriptive norm may become a stable convention. And conventions that
prevent negative externalities, or those that come to fulfill an important
signaling function, especially when the signal is related to social status or
power, are easily amenable to being transformed into social norms.
There are many rules of social interaction we usually think of as mere
conventions but, on closer inspection, show all the characteristics of social
norms. These rules have become so entrenched in the texture of our
lives, so imbued with social"meanings, that we cannot ignore them with
impunity. Everyday life is rife with implicit conventions directing the way
we speak, walk, make eye contact, and keep a distance from other people.
We are seldom aware of them until they are broken; however, when they
are breached we may experience anger, outrage, and confusion. A person
:Vho speaks too loudly, stands too close, or touches us in unexpected ways
~s usually perceived as disturbing and offensive, if not outright frightenmg. Cultures differ in setting the boundaries of personal space, but once
~ese boundaries are in place, they define 'normal' interactions, help
In predicting others' behavior, and assign meaning to it. The rules that
sha?e the perimeter of our personal sphere thus have an important sig~ahng function: We resent those who trespass these boundaries precisely
Cecause we perceive those individuals as being hostile and threatening.
onventions of public decorum, such as manners and etiquette, are more
explicit but not less important because, among other things, they signal
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respect for others and for social relationships. Breaching them can
and bring forth retaliation. Simmel's example of the dangers of
to greet an acquaintance on the street underscores this point:
someone on the street proves no esteem whatever, but failure to do
conclusively proves the opposite. The forms of courtesy fail as symbols
positive, inner attitudes, but they are most useful in documenting "'-"'o.uvF
ones, since even the slightest omission can radically and definitely
our relation to a person." 30 When a conventional manner of inrPr,..,.,-,.,~
has acquired such an important social meaning, we would rather refer
it as a social norm. Such norms, as opposed to conventions, are
panied by what are perceived as legitimate expectations of
We feel almost entitled to a courteous greeting, and the annoyance
resentment we direct against those who willingly ignore us indicate
are in the realm of normative expectations.
Following Social Norms
Social norms prescribe or proscribe behavior; they entail obligations
are supported by normative expectations. Not only do we expect others
conform to a social norm; we are also aware that we are expected to
form, and both these expectations are necessary reasons to comply
the norm. Contrary to what happens with descriptive norms and rnnu.F>ntions, being expected (and preferred) to conform to a social norm
also give us a sufficient reason to conform. I have mentioned fear,
olence, and the desire to fulfill others' legitimate expectations as
different reasons why normative expectations (and preferences)
to conformity. Fear should never be discounted, because there are
cases in which one obeys a norm only because neglecting others' expel:tations and preferences will bring about some form of punishment. We
conform without attributing any intrinsic value to the norm and- ·
finding others' expectations legitimate. So~e Arab women may observe
Muslim sexual mores, and Corsican men embrace norms of rever'rge, for
fear of being punished if they break the rules. In both cases, they may
find their community norms oppressive and ill-suited to modern life, but
whoever speaks or rebels first runs the risk of bearing huge costs. Breaking the rules looks like the risky cooperative choice in a social dilemma.
Freedom from a bad norm is a public good that is often very difficult to
bring about.
so Cf. G. Simmel (1950, p. 400).

Following Social Norms

43

At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who conform be.cause
ibute some value to what the norm stands for. People vary m the
theY a ttr
ee to which they are prepared to stand for a given norm. Some of us
degre a rule of reciprocity,
· · b ecause we see h ow It
· l1eIps society
· f unctiOn
·
1
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·
d
h
dth
I
·
·
smoothly, but we would~be prepare to s e
e ru e m an enVIronment
where it is consistently violated. Others might find deep moral reasons for
holding it even in the face of betrayals. A thirteenth-century member
~f tiie ruling class would have refrained from blowing his nose in the
tablecloth because that behavior was not 'courtly' or appropriate for a
nobleman. Nowadays most of us would be ashamed at displaying such bad
manners in front of a table companion. Even if alone, we tend to avoid this
kind of behavior, finding it not just unsanitary but also a little demeaning.
The negative social sanctions that may follow a transgression are usually
reasons for compliance when a social norm is not well established. But
later, when the norm has become a well-entrenched practice and we have
come to attribute a certain virtue to what it prescribes, external sanctions
seldom play a role in inducing conformity. Thus a smoker who avoids
smoking in public places for fear of being reprimanded may in time
come to see the merit of tliis policy and refrain from smoking in public
places even when alone. Philosophers have pointed out that it is a fallacy
to infer ought from is, but personal as well as historical evidence tells us
that we are readily victims of this 'naturalistic fallacy': 'When a practice is
well entrenched, we often come to attribute to it some intrinsic value. In
such cases we recognize the legitimacy of others' expectations and feel
an obligation to fulfill them.
Neither the person who-obeys a norm because a reward or a punishment is in place, nor the person who always obeys out of a deep conviction
of the norm's merits presents us with a particular problem. Sometimes,
however, we follow social norms even in the absence of external sanctions:
Our choices are anonymous, and we are reasonably sure nobody is going
to monitor us and detect behqvior that runs counter to the norm. Even
if a choice is not strictly anonymous, there are many cases in which we
can easily turn our backs to the situation and leave without risking any
penalty. When we leave a tip at the diner sitting along the motorway we
happen to be passing, we are behaving like regular customers even if this
is the first and probably the last time we will see that waiter, so there is no
obvious punishment or reward in place. It might be argued that in this
case we are in the grip of personal norms and would experience guilt or
shame were we to transgress our self-imposed rules. If this were the case,
We should observe consistent compliance with a tipping norm in a variety
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of circumstances, but often the same individual who is ready to leave a tip
at the diner may not do so when in a foreign country, even in those cases
in which the 'service included' clause is not present. The same inconstancy we encounter with tipping may occur with respect to much more
important social norms, such as those regulating fair division or reciprocation. People who reciprocate on one occasion may avoid reciprocating
on others without apparent reason. I am not referring here to cases in
which it is acceptable to transgress a norm. 31 For almost every norm one
can think of, there are socially acceptable exceptions to it. Thus I am normally expected to return favors, but an intervening hardship may excuse
me; similarly, many would deem it inappropriate to return a favor that
was not requested and looks like a veiled bribe; The cases of interest are
rather those in which one is expected to adhere to a norm and does not,
but we have evidence that on other, similar occasions, the same person
complied with the norm even in the absence of any obvious sanction.
I am interested in explaining such apparent inconsistencies across ·and
within individuals.
The brief taxonomy of norms I have proposed is of some help here,
because what is baffling is not inconsistency in following a descriptive
norm or a convention, but the inconsistency we experience with regard
to social norms. For example, when a coordinating convention is in place,
it is in everybody's interest to follow it, and when we observe inconsistent
behavior we are likely to attribute it either to a misunderstanding of the
situation or to poor learning about how and when to follow the convention. Whenever I go back to England, I have to pay special attention the
first few days I drive a car, because driving on the left side of the road feels
unnatural. If I were tired or absentminded, I would be prone to make
a dangerous mistake. Since expectations play such an important r0le
in supporting conventions - as well as descriptive norms - a change in
expectations (of others' conformity) may be another reason why we stop
follo'Aing a convention we observed until now. We may subsequently realize it was a mistake, because the convention is still followed, and reve'h to
the old behavior. Alternatively, when a new convention is in place we are
more likely to fluctuate in compliance. Dress codes are a good example.
It is now customary in many American companies to have a day (usually
Friday) of "business casual" dressing. Many friends reported embarrassing situations in which they were the only ones in jeans and sneakers, only

to realize that the following Friday, when they reverted to dressier suits,
rnore coworkers had adopted the "dress down" code. It usually takes some
time to stabilize on a common dress code, and in the meantime behavior
can be quite hectic.
The case of social-norms. is more complex. Norms are sometimes stated
in vague and general terms and operate in the presence of areas of indeterminacy and ambiguity. Several norms may apply to the same situation,
or it may not be clear which norms have a bearing in a given case. Whenever it is unclear which norm applies to a given situation, we may of
course expect irregular behavior, as the former example of tipping in
a foreign country illustrates. Variance is also to be expected (or at least
it is explainable) when sanctions have been introduced or removed or,
for some reason, there has been a change in expectations. With fairness
and reciprocity norms, it is often in one's interest to break the norm, to
yield to temptation. vVhy should I accept a fair division ifi have the upper
hand and, moreover, I will not interact with my partner in the future? Why
should I reciprocate my neighbor's favors if I am moving to a different
town soon? My sudden transformation can be altogether explained by
self-interest, boosted by a change in sanctions and expectations. Another
possible reason for inconsistent behavior is weakness of the will. Whenever the temptation is too great, the bait too alluring, I may break a norm
that I othenvise approve of and regularly obey.
Yet, if no such reason is apparent and we know that a person (a)
approves of a given norm and (b) has conformed to it on other, similar
occasions, we could either conclude that norms' influence on behavior
has been overstated or that we need a better understanding of the role
of situational cues in inducing conformity. Indeed, factors having nothing to do with the norm in question- including other norms, attitudes,
or environmental factors - may attenuate or emphasize its impact on
actions. Environmental stimuli in particular have been reported by psychologists to cause major changes in the kinds of behaviors, such as the
propensity to help other people, that we usually expect to manifest a
certain consistency and that are taken to signal a character disposition.
Several studies of helping behavior indicate that people are more likely
to help others if they are in a familiar environment, or if the request
comes from a female. When facing emergencies, people are much more
likely to intervene if they are alone. The presence of other bystanders
to an accident seems to consistently dampen altruistic ardor (Latane
~nd Darley 1968). Similarly, we have no indication of a general disposition to take normative considerations as overriding, or of an unfailing

31

Even criminal law recognizes mitigating circumstances such as duress, coercion, insanity,
and accident.
)
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inclination to obey a norm whenever a norm is in place. Quite to
contrary, all the evidence we have points to situational factors as
a significant influence on behavior. However, as much as situational
tors may attenuate the impact of norms on behavior, the opposite is
true: Situational factors may increase the effect of norms on behavior
making a norm salient. Unfortunately, there are no experiments
personal (as opposed to interpersonal) variations in behavior in
situations, where the experimenter slightly varies the environment or
description of the situation. In the following chapters, I will present
indirect evidence that supports the hypothesis that situational
are extremely important in focusing actors on social norms, thus mciuc:m~
or preventing conformity.

are paramount, in the sense that their presence is crucial in priming a
nn, does it make sense to say that a person chooses to follow a norm? If
110
one is unaware of the stimuli and the cognitive process whose outcome
is norm-congruent behavior, can we still claim that it is rational to follow
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In the next chapters, the idea tliat norms influence behavior only
they are salient or focal for the individual at the time of behavior will
expanded on and put to the test. If people are not strongly focused
a norm, I shall argue, even strong personal norms are not predictive
relevant behavior. Normative focus, in turn, is enhanced or mitigated
situational cues that draw attention to (or distract attention from) a
vant norm. There is by now a large database of experimental results
Trust, Ultimatum, and Social Dilemma games, in which small
in the environment or the way in which the game is presented
major behavioral changes. Individuals may be cooperative on some
sions and selfish in others, give generously or reciprocate at times and
'mean' at other times. If a fairness norm is activated in condition x,
the game is one-shot and the players anonymous, why is it not .,.cuv;uc::u
in the slightly different condition y, in a similar one-shot,
encounter? Because the apparently inconsistent behaviors are not
lated with the presence or absence of sanctions, this variability has
several authors to discount the importance of norms as explan~tory
abies in such experiments (Dawes et al. 1977). The reasoning J.IOa'uuJ. 5
to this conclusion is that - if a person were to uphold a norm that person would conform to it in all circumstances to which the nann
applies. This belief presupposes that (a) we are always aware.of our
sonal standards and ready to act on them, and (b) situational factors
no influence on our behavioral dispositions. Because I will focus next on
situational factors and their influence, I will now restrict my attention
the issue ofnormativity and choice. For example, when situational ~"•-•v••~·
!

that norm?
When mentioning the expectations and preferences that support confonnity to a social norm, I referred to reasons for following a norm, and
having reasons can be interpreted as mentally referring to a norm before
acting, having intentions, and making a reasoned (and rational) choice.
For example, we may say that the trader who uses the conventional signaling system is making a rational choice, because we assume she wants
to communicate and, through communication, reach her goal of buying and selling shares. There is a difference, though, between choosing
rationally and choosing a course of action because it is the rational thing
to do. In light of the coordinating role played by the trading-signaling
system, and assuming the trader's goal is to make trades, we judge the
trader's choice to be rational, but the trader herself may have been totally
unaware of having a choice. In this case, what has been activated is not
the deliberational route to behavior but rather the heuristic one. The
trader may have never thought about the signaling convention being a
coordinating device, nor might she be aware of any goal or plan that
following the convention helps her to achieve. This, I must add, is a
common experience; frequently we do not think much before acting, in
the sense that our behavior does not consciously follow from intentions
or plans and is carried out without awareness or attention. To engage
in thoughtful processes, we must be sufficiently motivated: The situation must have high personal relevance, our action must have important
consequences, we are held responsible for our choice, or there is some
challenge present. As opposed to this thoughtful evaluation of pros and
cons, we usually engage in a more rapid, heuristic form of processing.
The trader uses the signaling convention as a default, without a thought
to the benefits her behavior yields.
Even obeying a social norm can be, though by no means has to be,
a~ entirely automatic affair. We are, so to speak, in the grip of the situatiOn that primed the norm and are following it through the heuristic
:oute. Those individuals who cooperate in the initial stages of an experrrnental, finitely repeated public good game do not seem to have gone
through a mental process in which they calculated the costs and benefits
of being nice. Indeed, a simple calculation of costs and benefits might
have induced them to defect immediately, as game theory predicts they
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will do. On the other hand, these people are not dupes:
precipitously decays whenever people realize they have been cheated
others (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Fehr and Gachter 2000b). My hVllOthe:;i~
is that subjects in experiments act like any of us would in a new
and use social norms as defaults, at least initially. If not challenged,
.cooperative norm is adopted in all those situations in which it is
focal. If, however, the norm is violated often enough to be noticed,
will stop following it, at least in that situation. Recall that my definition
social norms entails that an individual needs to have conditional
ences and the right kind of expectations in order to follow a norm.
potential norm follower was represented as facing a Bayesian game. If
initially assesses a higher probability to being matched with another
follower, he will behave cooperatively. But he will revert to defecting if
realizes his expectations are not met. I am not claiming here that mine
a realistic model of how we reason, but, as will be made plain in the
lowing chapters, I maintain it is a fairly good explanatory and pre
model, because my definitions are operational and their
are testable. Furthermore, the fuct that we are not aware of our
processes does not mean that the beliefs and preferences that
the choice to conform have no existence. On many occasions our
scious awareness of a norm, and of the expectations and preferences
trigger conformity, is only brought about by the realization that the
has been violated.
Suppose you are one of the nice guys who choose to cooperate in
finitely repeated public good game. When asked to explain your
io!", you may offer a rational justification and refer to the choice to obey
norm: You may say that you would really feel guilty not to give it
and signal your good intentions. Or you may say that being CO()O(!raluve
is a good rule, and that it is better, in the long run, than being a
and therefore you are committed to it even on those occasions in
you may cheat with impunity. Your rational justification is part qf a
tive, an acceptable account of why we act as we do. Cognitive PS"¥CllO!Og1SUi.
tell us that we often have little direct introspective awareness or
to our higher level cognitive processes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977).32
may be unaware that certain stimuli influence our responses, or we
even be unaware of the existence of stimuli that have a ~ausal effect
our responses. Yet when questioned about our choices, judgments,

luations, we are usually quite articulate in offering credible reasons.
~va Iausible explanation is that our reports are based on implicit theo. p about the causal connection between stimulus and response. The
nes
causal theory we put forth may happen to be an accurate account of what
stimulus was influentiaJjn_producing our response, but accuracy, accordiilg to Nisbett and Wilson, is not synonymous with awareness. We may
accurately report that a particular stimulus was influential in producing
a behavioral response because the stimulus is available and salient, and it
appears to be a pla~~ible cause, not because we ~ave a p~vileged ~ccess
to our higher cogn1t1ve processes. If the actual stimulus 1s not available,
salieilt, or not deemed to be a plausible cause of the response, it will
.
d as umn
. fl uentla.
. 133
regularly be d1scounte
Latane and Darley's (1968) experiments on helping behavior offer
a disturbing example of how choices may be influenced by factors that
are outside our immediate awareness. Their subjects were progressively
more unlikely to help somebody in distress as the number of bystanders
increased, but they were entirely unaware of the effect that the presence of other people had on their behavior. Moreover, when the experiments were described in detail to different, nonparticipating subjects,
who were then asked to predict how others (and perhaps themselves)
would behave in similar circumstances, they concurred that the presence
of other people would have no effect on helping behavior. In this as well
as other similar experiments, the congruence between the participants'
reports and the predictions made by nonparticipants suggests that both
are drawn from a similar source. Nisbett and Wilson explain the congruence by referring to common, shared causal theories that make both
actor and observer 'perceive' co variations between particular stimuli and
responses. 34
Some of our reports may instead be highly accurate, as when we apply
the sequential steps of a ·decision process we have learned. A business
school graduate who is making the decision. whether to buy a particular
stock, for example, w:ill apply learned rules for evaluating the stock and
Weighing all the factors that have a bearing on its price. Her report on
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A high-order cognitive process mediates the effects of a stimulus on a complex
such as judgment, inference, problem solving, and choice.

:ve are usually blind to contextual factors, as well as to position, serial order, and anchorIng effects. Most people would think it is outrageous that the choices they make might
be influenced by such irrelevant factors as the position (say, from left to right) of the
object chosen.
The criterion for awareness proposed is a "verbal report which exceeds in accuracy
that obtained from observers provided with a general description of the stimulus and
response in question" (Nisbett and Wilson 1977, p. 251).
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her final choice will accurately list the weighted factors as reasons for
choice. Similarly, we might be fairly accurate about the weights we
to various factors in deciding what a fair division of a particular
should be. But this may happen because our culture (or
specifies rather dearly which factors should count in such a .........._.,,,'"''''
Still, being able to describe the evaluative criteria one has applied is
evidence of direct access to one's mental evaluation process.
The existence of a norm and of reasons for conformity might
be correctly reported as an explanation for our behavior, even if we
unaware of the complex mental process that resulted in that
Situational dependency can in turn be understood in two different
One is that the environment or situation we are in provides nP·rr.Pnh
stimuli to which we respond in an 'automatic,' unreflective way. Ex
we may or may not accurately report on the importance of t~e
uli, depending on whether they are available and how plausible
are as causal factors. Alternatively, we may see the situation as
encing the way in which we consciously interpret and understand
surroundings. A norm in this case can be made salient by particular
uational cues, but we still choose to follow it, that is, consider alt.•r'Tl-::~tm...<
and make mental reference to the norm before we act. I believe
accounts of situational dependency to be valid, depending on the
of awareness we experience at any given time. There are occasions
which we are unaware of the reasons why we do what we do, and
sions in which we are consciously thinking of a norm, and the ....,.~.c.-...n.
for following it, before acting. 35 Also in this second case, though,
should not confuse access to our private store of knowledge,
,
or plans with access to our cognitive processes, which are opaque
introspection. 36
Lack of awareness should not be equated with lack of rationality. It
possible to maintain that it is rational to follow a norm, even i:!l for
most part our subjective experience of conformity to a norm is

tional calculation. Compliance may look like a habit, thoughtless and
::wmatic, or it may be guided by feelings of anxiety at the thought of
hat might happen if one violates the norm. Yet conformity to a norm may
:e rational, and may be explained by the agents' beliefs and desires, even
though one does not-conform out of a conscious rational calculation.
As David Lewis himself pointed out in his analysis of habits, a habit may
be under an agent's rational control in the following sense: If that habit
ever ceased to serve the agent's desires according to his beliefs, it would
at once be overridden and abandoned. 37 Similarly, an explanation in
terms of norms does not compete with one in terms of expectations
and preferences, because a no.rm persists precisely because of certain
expectations and preferences: If I ever wanted to be different, or if I
expected others to do something different, I would probably overcome
the force of the norm.
We may conclude that awareness is not a necessary condition for being
rational, in the sense that, even if unaware, we may still act according
to our beliefs and desires. To maintain that following a norm can be
described, at least in principle, in terms of beliefs and desires and hence
as a (practically) rational choice allows us to think of norms as a special kind of unintended collective outcome of individual choices. 38 Such
outcomes have desirable properties, for example, they are equilibria of
coordination games. Note that being an equilibrium does not make a
social norm good or efficient; there are lots of bad equilibria around.
It simply means that the expectations and actions of all the parties concerned are consistent, or that their expectations are self-fulfilling. This
raises the important question of how such consistency comes about, but
we will discuss this later. Another important advantage of defining norms
in terms of beliefs and preferences is that we are providing an operational
definition of what a norm is. This is important in experimental studies,
where we want to assess whether the behavior we observe is due to the
presence of norms or to something else. Ifwe know that norms are only
followed if certain expectations exist, then it is possible to verify if indeed
people have those expectations, or to manipulate them in order to see
whether their behavior changes in predictable ways.
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A mental state is conscious when it is accompanied by a roughly simultaneous,
order thought about that very mental state. For example, a conscious experience
pain involves more than the simple registering of a painful sensatjon in the mind.
also includes a realization that one is having this sensation, a thought that "I am
pain."
Jones and Nisbett (1972) distinguish between content and process. Content includes all
sorts of private knowledge we possess: We know personal historical facts, our focus
attention at any given time, what we feel and sense, our evaluations, and our plans. They
convincingly maintain that we have introspective access to content but not to mental
processes.

37 D L .
38 • eMS,

1975, P· 25.
It is important to distinguish between practical and epistiJillic rationality (Bicchieri 1993).
Practical rationality is the rationality of an action, given the agent's goal and beliefs. Thus
goals may be unrealistic and beliefs false, and an action still may be practically rational.
Conversely, epistemic rationality is the rationality of the beliefs we hold.

52

Appendix to Chapter 1

Appendix to Chapter 1

tor degenerates. The second maximum operator ranges over all
opera
· word.s. th e d'IS~ountmg
·
e layers other than the norm violator. In p Iam
th P (multiplied by k;) is the maximum payoff deductiOn resultmg from
term
all norm violations.
.
..
.
Ai an example__to illustrate the above norm-based utihty func~on,
'der the Prisoner's Dilemma, where each player has two possible
.
const
ies· C (Cooperate) and D (Defect). The norm-based function for
strateg ·
..
.
either player is defined at C and undefined at D. The utility function for

In this short appendix I introduce a general utility function based
norms. Consider a typical n-person (normal-form) game. For ease of
mal treatment, think of a norm as a function that maps one's expe.ctation:
concerning the behavior of others into what one "ought to do." In
words, a norm regulates behavior conditional on other people's ~~·.. ~·· •v1
Denote the strategy set of player i by S;, and let S_; = il_¥; S1 be
set of strategy profiles of players other than i. Then a norm for player
is formally represented by a function N;: L;-+ S;, where L_; s; S_;. 39
an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, for example, a shared ·norm
be to cooperate. In that case, L; includes all the strategies of all
(excluding player z) that prescribe cooperation.
Two features of this definition are worth noting. First, given the
players' strategies, there may or may not be a norm that prescribes
player i ought to behave. So L_; need not be, and usually is not, equal
S_;. In particular, L_; could be empty in the situation where there is no
norm whatsoever to regulate player i's behavior. Second, there could
norms that regulate joint behaviors. A norm, for example, that
the joint behaviors of players i and j may be represented by N;,i L-i.-j-+
S; x ~. where L-i,-j is the set of strategies adopted by all players
than i and j. Because I am primarily concerned with two-person games,
will not further complicate the model in that direction.
A strategy profiles = (sJ, .. . , sn) instantiates a norm for jif LJ E L_1,
that is, if Nj is defined at S-J· It violates a norm if, for some j, it instantiates
a norm for jbut si f. Nj(s-J). Let:rr; be the payoff function ofplay,~r i. The
norm-based utility function of player i depends on the strategy profile s
and is given by

player 1 is then the following:
UI( C, C) = :rr 1 ( C, C) - k1 (:rr1 ( C, C) - :rri( C, C)) = :rr1 ( C, C)

U1 (D, D) = n 1(D, D) - k1 (n1 (D, D)
U1 ( C, D) = :rr1 ( C, D) - k1 (:rrd C, C)

40

Note that N need not be deterministic. As we shall see in Chapter 3, when we look at
Ultimatum games, N can also be a random variable.
k; is only unique up to some positive factor that varies according to the players' payoff
functions.
.

:

n1 (D, D)) = n1 (D, D)
:rr1 ( C, D))

U1 (D, C) = n1 (D, C)- k1 (n2(C, C)- n2(D, C)).

Player 2's utility function is similar. The game turns out to be a coordination game with two equilibria when U1 (D, C) < lh ( C, C) and U2 ( C, D) <
~(C, C), that is, when 41
n1 (D, C) - :rr1 ( C, C)
k! > n2(C, C)- :rr2(D, C )'
n2(C, D)- :rr2(C, C)
k2 >
.
:rr1 ( C, C) - :rr1 ( C, D)
Otherwise it remains a PD game.
As an example, take the PD game in Figure 1.1 and assume the players'
payoffs are as follows:
Other

Other

c

where k; 2: 0 is a constant representing a player's sensitivity to the relevant
norm. 40 The first maximum operator takes care of the possibility that the
norm instantiation (and violation) might be ambiguous, in the sense that
a strategy profile instantiates a norm for several players sipmltaneously.
However, this situation never occurs in my examples, so the first maximum
39
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Coordination Game
Figure 1.6
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Note that u1 (D,C) stands for the utility of player 1 when 1 plays D and 2 plays C. Analogously, U2(D,C) stands for the utility of player 2 when 1 plays Dand 2 plays C.
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In this case, 1r ( C, C)
However,

= 2 and 1r (D, D)

1.

and
1r1

lft (D, C)= 4

(D, C)}

1r2(D, C)

= 4- k1 (2);

similar calculations hold for player 2.
For both players to prefer to cooperate with each other, it must be that
both k1 and ~ are greater than 1. For example, if we assume that, say,
both k1 and ~ are equal to 2, we obtain the above coordination game
(Figure 1.6). Note that it is not necessary to assume that k1 and ~ are
the same. In fact, players may have different degrees of 'sensitivity' to a
norm. Being 'sensitive' to a norm simply means that one dislikes being
the victim of a norm violation as well as being the transgressor. We may .
thus say that k defines different types of players. In our simple example,
there can be only two types of players: Either a player's kis greater than 1,.
or it is equal to or less than 1.
In this case, player i (with k; > 1) is rational iff she chooses a strategy s;
such that the expected utility EU(s;) ::::, EU(s/) for all s/ ::j s; E S;, calculated with respect to the probability that (k1 > 1). It is important to
remember that when a player is faced with a PD game and has no information about the identity or past actions of the other player, she will
rationally choose to 'follow the cooperative norm' if two conditions are
satisfied. She must be a potential norm-follower (i.e., her kmust be greater
than 1) and she must believe that the other player's k-value is such that it
makes him sensitive to the norm (in our example, it must also be greater
than 1). In other words, a norm-follower fuced with a PD game will have
to assess the probability that the other player is the norm-following type.
In our case, if p(~ > 1) > 1/2, player 1 will choose to cooperate.

